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Norden per automatik försvann. Den här avhandlingen visar att samarbete mellan de nordiska länderna och 
samarbete inom EU kan existera samtidigt, det ena utesluter inte det andra. I motsats till de forskare som i 
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EU. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the autumn of 1994, the European Union was on everybody’s lips in the three Nordic 
countries Finland, Sweden and Norway. In three separate referenda, the Finns, Swedes 
and Norwegians were asked whether their countries should join the European Union or 
not. The rapid changes in Europe, caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, forced the Nordic countries to redefine their position in the world. The 
Nordic “third way” or “middle way”1, which had been so well known during the Cold 
War, suddenly lost significance when the world was no longer divided between the two 
superpowers USA and the Soviet Union. Norden2, which is composed of the five very 
closely connected countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and which 
had been seen as a region associated with progressivity, neutrality, and a well-
developed welfare system, lost some of its peculiarity in this new situation. In addition, 
the economic crises in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s led to cutbacks in the 
welfare, which made some scholars refer to the situation in the Nordic countries as “the 
end of the welfare state”.3 Others went as far as saying that the old way of defining 
Norden was dead.4 In a debate book, published by the Nordic Council in August 1994, 
researcher Pertti Joenniemi wrote: 
“It is obvious that the Nordic cooperation as a sphere has lost significance in the power 
structure that has risen after the Cold War. The Nordic self-esteem has decreased; positions 
concerning the future of Norden have a defensive character. The meeting with the European 
has caused a fight over the Nordic”.5 (My translation) 
The new geopolitical situation together with an increased significance of the EU, both 
economically and politically, forced Nordic politicians to reformulate their stands on the                                                         
1 The concept the ”middle way” was first coined by the American journalist Marquis Childs, who 
published his book Sweden: the Middle Way in 1936. The concept has later, together with the concept of 
the ”third way”, been used in a wider sense, to describe not only the Swedish model but also the Nordic 
model as an alternative to capitalism, on the one hand, and communism, on the other.  
2 In this thesis, I will use the Scandinavian word Norden when referring to the five Northern European 
countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Strictly speaking, Norden also include the 
autonomous areas: the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. In my research, however, they 
will receive lesser attention. The same applies for Iceland, as the EU debate was not yet a current issue 
there in 1994. 
3 Henningsen, Bernd (1997): The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity. In Stråth, Bo – Sørensen, 
Øystein (ed.). The Cultural Construction of Norden. Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget 
AS), Oslo, 94. 
4 Joenniemi, Pertti (1994a): Norden – en europeisk megaregion? In Karlsson, Svenolof (ed.). Norden är 
död. Länge leve Norden! En debattbok om de nordiska länderna som en ’megaregion’ i Europa. Nordiska 
rådet, Stockholm, 23-81. 
5 Joenniemi 1994a, 39. 
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European integration. But the decision to apply for EU-membership, and even more so 
the results of the referenda, also had an effect on the Nordic reality. After being a stable 
concept during the Cold War, a redefinition of what Norden really meant, was 
underway. Several researchers claimed that Norden had fallen into an identity crisis. 
When Norden no longer was different from the rest of Europe, the Nordic identity, 
which had been built on difference, was, according to them, at a loss. This study will 
therefore look into how Norden and the Nordic identity were manifested at the time of 
the three Nordic EU-referenda. By conducting a content analysis of newspaper 
editorials in the three major Nordic newspapers Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter 
and Aftenposten, I hope to show how some of the most important creators of public 
opinion framed Norden prior to the referenda. How was Norden used as an argument in 
the EU-debates? Was Norden put in contrast to Europe or was Norden seen as a part of 
Europe? Was the Nordic identity really in a crisis? 
 
1.1 Background 
The Nordic countries’ way to the EU 
When the European integration project6 started in the early 1950s none of the Nordic 
countries were willing or able to join the project. David Phinnemore mentions two 
factors why this did not happen: a strong attachment to national identity and national 
sovereignty as well as the incompatibility of the neutral countries Sweden and Finland 
to join a supranational organisation.7 Access to the trade markets was, however, crucial 
for the Nordic countries and when Britain, in 1959, took the initiative to establish a 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an alternative to the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark were all 
among the founding members.8 In consideration to its Soviet neighbour, Finland 
concluded a separate free trade agreement with EFTA in 1961, but eventually became a 
full member in 1986. The fifth Nordic country, Iceland, became a member of EFTA in 
                                                        
6 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951, followed by the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM in 1957. In 1967, these three institutions were later 
merged together into the European Communities (EC). The founding members of the European 
integration were: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
7 Phinnemore, David (1996): The Nordic countries, the European Community (EC) and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), 1958-84. In Miles, Lee (ed.). The European Union and the Nordic 
Countries. Routledge, London, 34.  
8 EFTA was founded in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. 
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1970.9 When Britain, together with Ireland, applied for membership in the EEC one 
year after the establishment of EFTA, Denmark and Norway decided to follow.10 For 
Sweden, an application for an association agreement with the EC was enough, while 
Finland and Iceland had neither intention or plans to join the Community nor to aspire 
an associate status. The British application was, however, vetoed by the French 
president Charles de Gaulle, and as a consequence the accession negotiations with all 
four countries ended. In 1967, the same procedure was repeated: Britain, Ireland, 
Norway and Denmark applied for membership in the EEC, but de Gaulle vetoed and the 
negotiations ended. When de Gaulle resigned in 1969, the applications were reactivated 
and in 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Communities. In 
Norway, the population voted against EC-membership in a referendum in 1972.11 In 
Sweden, EC-membership was seen as incompatible with the country’s neutrality policy. 
Instead, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland all signed separate free trade agreements 
with the EC. 
 
As described in the book Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete 
edited by Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund, Nordic and European integration has 
always been closely connected.12 A failure in Nordic cooperation has often been 
followed by, or in some cases due to, a success in the European integration. Similarly, 
when the European project has encountered problems, the Nordic cooperation has often 
been strengthened. For instance, the Nordic customs union, which was being planned 
during the 1950s, was eventually abandoned when Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
joined the EFTA. Correspondingly, the Danish and Norwegian EEC-applications made 
it important to write down the agreements made so far within the Nordic cooperation 
and therefore the Helsinki Treaty, which stipulates the official Nordic cooperation, was 
ratified in 1962. Claes Wiklund writes, “Only through references to a binding 
international treaty was the Nordic cooperation considered to be able to stay intact in 
                                                        
9 EFTA (2012): EFTA through the years, website. 
10 Mission of Norway to the European Union (2012): Norway and the EU – An Historical Overview, 
website. 
11 Mission of Norway to the European Union (2012): Norway and the EU – An Historical Overview, 
website. 
12 Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.) (2000): Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt 
samarbete. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm. 
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the situation where one or several Nordic countries joined the EEC”.13 A third example 
of how the Nordic and European integration has taken place parallelly in Norden is the 
case of Nordek. After de Gaulle had vetoed the British, and by consequence also the 
Danish and Norwegian EEC-applications for the second time, a deeper Nordic 
economic cooperation was planned in its place. Nordek would include a Nordic customs 
union and Nordic structural and development funds, but the plan was eventually 
abandoned after de Gaulle had resigned and a Danish and Norwegian membership in the 
EEC became possible.14  
 
In the 1980s, the cooperation between the EFTA and the EC gradually intensified. A 
significant milestone in the relations between EFTA and the EC was the Luxembourg 
Declaration of 1984, where a plan of closer cooperation between them was agreed with 
the intention of creating a better functioning free market.15 In 1989, the idea of 
institutionalising the relations between the EFTA and the EC was launched by the 
President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors.16 Finland, Sweden and Norway 
welcomed the idea of a European Economic Area (EEA) since it gave them access to 
the EC’s Single Market, while in the same time offering a “de-politicised version of the 
EC membership”17. But during the EEA negotiations, the EFTA countries started 
questioning whether the EEA-agreement suited their long-term needs. The EFTA 
countries were increasingly economically dependent on the EC, while the EEA-
agreement would not allow them to participate in the decision-making of the EC.18 The 
EEA-agreement was finally signed in May 1992 and it came into force in January 1994. 
By this time, Sweden, Finland and Norway had all applied for full membership in the 
EC. 
 
Sieglinde Gstöhl calls the EFTA countries “reluctant Europeans”, since they for a long 
time did not want to join the European Communities although they met the criteria for                                                         
13 Wiklund, Claes (2000a): 1962 års Helsingforsavtal – den första heltäckande nordiska 
samarbetstraktaten. In Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes (ed.). Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom 
nordiskt samarbete. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm, 100. 
14 Wiklund, Claes (2000b): Nordek-planen och dess föregångare. In Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, Claes 
(ed.). Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete. Santérus Förlag, Stockholm, 107-123. 
15 Aunesluoma, Juhana (2011): Vapaakaupan tiellä. Suomen kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka 
maailmansodista EU-aikaan. Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki, 384-387. 
16 Gstöhl, Sieglinde (1996): The Nordic countries and the European Economic Area (EEA). In Miles, Lee 
(ed.). The European Union and the Nordic Countries. Routledge, London, 55-56. 
17 Gstöhl, 56. 
18 Gstöhl, 60. 
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membership at an early stage.19 The main factor for the Nordic countries to participate 
in the European integration has not been political, but economic.20 For different reasons, 
a full membership in the EC and later the EU had been seen as impossible during a long 
period of time and it was not until the early 1990s that Nordic politicians started talking 
warmly about a EU-membership. In Sweden, the reluctance towards the EC/EU 
stemmed from the incompatibility with the country’s policy of non-alignment and a 
membership in a supranational organisation. For Finland, an orientation towards 
Western Europe was more tempting, but impossible with regards to the big neighbour in 
the East. Finnish post-war politics and up until the fall of the Soviet Union, was 
characterised by an unwillingness to irritate the Soviet leadership and the Fenno-Soviet 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was in force until the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As long as the agreement was in force, it made 
Finland’s EU-membership in practice impossible. In Norway, the popular suspicion 
towards centrally controlled organisations like the EC/EU has always been strong, 
although the political elite has been more favourably disposed towards European 
integration.  
 
There were several reasons why Sweden eventually applied for full EC/EU-
membership. The economic dependency towards the EC in addition to the lack of 
influence on the decision-making within the EEA framework was one important factor. 
Both Sweden and Finland were subjected to an economic recession in the early 1990s, 
which made an increased economic cooperation within the EC even more attractive. 
The geopolitical changes ended the division of Europe into two and the importance of 
the Swedish neutrality policy declined. The position of the Swedish Social Democratic 
government in the EU-matter during 1990 could be described as a gradual U-turn. 
Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson wrote several articles in the newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter, where he described how the EC-obstacles could be cleared away.21 According 
to Swedish historian Bo Stråth, a redefinition of the concept of neutrality was in 
progress and the peak of this redefinition was in October 1990, when the Swedish 
                                                        
19 Gstöhl, 48. 
20 Phinnemore, 33. 
21 Stråth, Bo (1993): Folkhemmet mot Europa Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet. Tiden, Falun, 235. 
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government declared its wish to have a closer relationship to the EC than the EEA 
agreement would allow.22 In practice, that signified a full membership.  
 
The Swedish government’s announcement in October 1990 to seek full membership in 
the EC, took the Finnish leadership by surprise. In Finnish president Mauno Koivisto’s 
opinion, the EEA-agreement was enough to fulfil the Finnish economic needs and he 
was disappointed that the Nordic cooperation once again had been faced with an 
accomplished fact without any preliminary discussions.23 This shows how important the 
feeling of solidarity was in Norden. Eventually Finland also followed its neighbour 
country and submitted a membership application in March 1992. Heikki Paloheimo 
points out that the Finnish decision to apply for EU-membership was above all due to 
economic reasons. The Finnish government believed that a EU-membership would help 
the recovery from the economic recession of the early 1990s, increase the standard of 
living and allow Finland to participate in the EU decision-making.24 Other scholars have 
stressed also security considerations and identity politics.25 After Sweden and Finland 
had applied for membership, Norway found it necessary to follow its Nordic 
neighbours. According to Lee Miles, the Norwegian incentives for applying for EU-
membership were more political than economic. Norway had not experienced the same 
kind of recession as Finland and Sweden thanks to the country’s oil exports.26 Ever 
since the No in the EC-referendum in 1972, European integration had been a difficult 
subject in Norway, but after the Swedish and Finnish applications, the Norwegian 
government headed by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland quickly submitted the 
Norwegian application in November 1992.27 
 
The EU-campaigns in Finland, Sweden and Norway 
After the negotiation processes between the Nordic countries and the EU had been 
finalized, the people of these countries were to give their opinions on the negotiated 
                                                        
22 Stråth, 236 
23 Koivisto, Mauno (2008): Grannar. Frändskap och friktion. Atlantis, Stockholm and Söderströms, 
Helsinki, 188. 
24 Paloheimo, Heikki (1995): Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden peruslinjat ja 
kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotissa ja Norjassa. In Politiikka, 37(2), 115. 
25 Aunesluoma, 491-496. 
26 Miles, Lee (1996): The Nordic countries and the fourth EU enlargement. In Miles, Lee (ed.). The 
European Union and the Nordic Countries. Routledge, London, 65. 
27 Miles, 65. 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agreements.28 Out of the Nordic countries, the Finnish referendum was scheduled first, 
on October 16, 1994. The Swedish referendum followed on November 13, 1994 and the 
Norwegian referendum was held on November 28, 1994. The EU-opponents were 
critical to the order of the referenda, where the least sceptical Finns were to vote first, 
followed by the Swedes and the last election was to be held in the most EU-sceptical 
country, Norway. This order was believed to create a domino effect, where the Finnish 
results would have an effect on the Swedish results and these in turn would influence 
the Norwegian results. 
  
Heikki Paloheimo’s article Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden 
peruslinjat ja kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotsissa ja Norjassa29 provides a 
useful overview on the political and public opinion on the EU-issue in the three Nordic 
countries. According to him, the EU-debate in Finland was largely affected by the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The turbulences in the Eastern neighbour country 
influenced the debate on Finland’s security policy and also led to an economic 
recession. Another argument was that Finland by joining the EU would prove that the 
country belonged to the West. Finnish Member of Parliament, Mikko Rönnholm (Social 
Democratic Party), went as far as saying that the decision stood between “kyllä ja 
niet”30. The main arguments of the Finnish EU-opponents were linked to the EU 
agricultural policy and a fear of losing the country’s independence. There was also a 
fear of higher unemployment rates and a decrease in the Nordic social security system. 
At the end of the 1980s, no political party in Finland was yet in favour of EC-
membership, but by the time of the referendum, all large political parties were positive 
towards an accession, except for the Left Alliance and the Greens who did not officially 
take sides. Among the people, however, the opinions were divided. 
 
Also in Sweden, most of the large political parties were pro-EU, although some parties 
had some reservations. The Left Party and the Green Party were clearly against an 
accession. The Swedish EU-referendum in mid-November was preceded by 
Parliamentary elections in mid-September. The Social Democrats regained power and                                                         
28 Austria had applied for EU-membership already in July 1989 and was together with Sweden, Finland 
and Norway the candidate countries for the fourth EU-enlargement. 
29 Paloheimo, Heikki (1995): Pohjoismaiden EU-kansanäänestykset: puolueiden peruslinjat ja 
kansalaisten mielipiteet Suomessa, Ruotissa ja Norjassa. In Politiikka, 37(2). 
30 In English that would be “Yes and Nyet”. Nyet means No in Russian. 
 10 
Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson pleaded the Social Democratic partisans to vote Yes to 
the EU. Both the Yes-side and the No-side used the economy and the jobs as one of 
their main arguments. The Yes-side believed the EU would help the economy while the 
No-side thought the EU would make the economic situation even worse. Moreover, the 
No-side feared that Sweden would lose its right of self-determination. According to 
Paloheimo, the importance of the West as a cultural point of reference was not as 
important in Sweden as it was in Finland and the same applies for the security policy 
issues.  
 
In Norway, the debate was much fiercer than in the neighbouring countries. The No-
supporters’ strongest arguments, as listed by Paloheimo, were the fishing industry, the 
agriculture, the regional policy and keeping the Northern parts of Norway inhabited. In 
addition to these arguments, there was also a fear of having to share the proceeds from 
the oil industry with other countries, a fear of a decline in the equality between the sexes 
and an intensified political cooperation within the EU as well as the plain fact of once 
again being in a union. Norway did not gain its independence until 1905 when the union 
with Sweden was dissolved. Among the political parties, only Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland’s party the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party were pro-
EU, while the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Left Party were 
against EU-membership and the Liberal Party and the populist Progress Party did not 
take stands.  
 
1.2 Previous research 
The EU-referenda in Finland, Sweden and Norway have given rise to a vast amount of 
research. The previously conducted literature could be divided into studies on the 
historical context leading up to the referenda, studies on the campaigns and the actual 
referenda and, lastly, the effects and consequences of the referenda results. For the 
purpose of this study, it is most valuable to give an overview of the studies made on the 
actual referenda. The subject of the studies in this area varies from the political party 
positions concerning the EU, the arguments for and against EU-accession, the activities 
of the popular movements, and the coverage of the referenda in the media, among 
others. For my research, the media coverage of the referenda is the most relevant. 
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In Finland, a research project, which lasted from the fall of 1992 until the turn of the 
year 1995-1996, and which was financed by the Academy of Finland, examined the EU-
debate in Finland from the point of view of the citizens, the media and the actors in the 
debate. The vast research project resulted in a book edited by Ullamaija Kivikuru.31 The 
editor Kivikuru states that the EU-referendum was the biggest publicity process in 
Finland since the wars and that the role of the mass media was already before the 
referendum predicted to have a decisive effect on the results.32 The actual research on 
the Finnish media in the EU-referenda context showed that the citizens felt that the 
media had allied itself with the pro-EU decision-makers and that few alternative 
discourses were presented to the citizens.33 This study reveals a lot about the media 
climate in Finland but do not cover the Nordic aspect of the referenda. 
 
A lot of comparisons between different news media as well as analyses on how the 
media portrayed different aspects of the EU-debate have been done, but most of them 
only offer national comparisons of the media in one of the three countries. An example 
of this is Ingunn Breivik’s34 master’s thesis on the rhetoric of the EU-matter in the 
editorial pages of four Norwegian newspapers. She examined whom the different 
newspapers saw as the opponents in the EU-debate and she also described which 
rhetorical methods the newspapers used to describe these opponents. Her results showed 
that both Yes-papers and No-papers used methods like stereotypes, and pessimistic 
descriptions to defame people with other opinions than the newspapers. Tuomo 
Mörä’s35 doctoral dissertation is also set in the EU-referenda context, but in Finland. 
His approach is somewhat different, since he, by interviewing journalists in Finnish 
media, aims at explaining “[W]hy some issues, angles and actors received more 
coverage that [sic!] some others”36. Mörä, who also contributed with a text in the earlier 
mentioned book edited by Kivikuru, examines what factors lay behind the publication 
of certain EU-stories. Mörä’s results are interesting, but while his study focuses on the 
factors, which influence journalists to write certain texts, my study concentrates on the                                                         
31 Kivikuru, Ullamaija (ed.) (1996): Kansa euromyllyssä. Journalismi, kampanjat ja mediamaisemat 
Suomen EU-jäsenyysprosessissa. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki. 
32 Kivikuru, 1-3. 
33 Kivikuru, 393-394. 
34 Breivik, Ingunn (2006): EU-striden på leiarplass: Ein retorisk analyse av fire norske dagsaviser. 
Universitet i Bergen, Bergen. 
35 Mörä, Tuomo (1999): EU-journalismin anatomia. Mediasisältöjä muokanneet tekijät ennen 
kansanäänestystä 1994. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki. 
36 Mörä, 279. 
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journalistic outcome or the content in the newspapers. Studies like Breivik’s and Mörä’s 
are relevant to my research in the sense that they describe the media climate in Norway 
and Finland in the EU-context, but they do, however, lack a comparative angle. This 
angle is covered by Katarina Cygnel-Nuortie37, who has written her master’s thesis on 
how business executives were portrayed in the press in Finland, Sweden and Norway 
prior to the referenda. She described how often business executives appeared, what 
opinions they represented and if there were differences or similarities between the 
presentations of these leaders in the three countries. My study will similarly compare 
the press in the three countries, but my research question concentrates on the 
presentation of Norden and Nordic identity instead of business managers. Moreover, my 
study aims at providing a deep, qualitative analysis of the meaning of Norden in the 
editorials and not merely a quantitative counting of the frequency of the mentions of 
Norden. I feel that there is a lack of empirical studies made on the significance of 
Norden in the light of the EU-referenda. I therefore believe that my research will fill a 
gap in the research on the EU-referenda as well as in the research on Nordic studies. 
 
1.3 Research questions and concepts 
As we all know, Finland and Sweden voted Yes to EU-membership in the autumn of 
1994 while the Norwegians said No to the EU in their popular vote.38 Finland and 
Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995. In this study, the referenda 
results are of lesser importance, and the same applies to the national quarrels between 
the Yes- and the No-side. The focus in this study is instead put on how Norden was 
presented in the debate prior to the referenda and how Norden was used as an argument 
by the Yes- and the No-sides and in the different newspapers. An additional goal is to 
investigate whether a Nordic identity was referred to in the debate. Ever since the end of 
the Second World War, Norden had been a stable concept. The changes in Europe in the 
early 1990s also led to a redefinition of Norden. Several scholars were concerned with                                                         
37 Cygnel-Nuortie, Katarina (1996): Yritysjohtaja julkisuudessa. Suomalaisten, ruotsalaisten ja 
norjalaisten yritysjohtajien osallistuminen joukkoviestimissä syksyllä 1994 käytyyn EU-keskusteluun. 
Helsingin yliopisto, Helsinki. 
38 In Finland, 56.9% of the population wanted their country to join the European Union, while 43.1% 
voted No. In Sweden, the Yes-side won with 52.3% of the votes against 46.8% on the No-side. In 
Norway, 52.2% of the population voted No to EU-membership while 47.8% were willing to join the 
union. Sources: Pesonen, Pertti (ed.) (1994): Suomen EU-kansanäänestys 1994. Raportti äänestäjien 
kannanotoista. Ulkoasiainministeriö, Eurooppatiedotus, Painatuskeskus Oy, Helsinki, 183; 
Regeringskansliet Sverige (2012). Genomförda nationella folkomröstningar. Website; Official Statistics 
of Norway (1994): The 1994 Referendum on Norwegian Membership of the EU.  Statistics Norway, Oslo-
Kongsvinger, 12. 
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the Nordic identity being in a crisis and they sketched out possible paths Norden would 
take after the EU-accession of up to three more Nordic countries.39 There are, however, 
few studies that provide empirical evidence of how the debate on the future Norden 
actually went at the time and that is where this study can offer something new. Unlike 
other studies on Norden’s “health” at the time of the EU-referenda, this study is built on 
actual opinions, manifested through the editorial pages of three major Nordic 
newspapers. The reason why I have chosen to conduct a media content analysis is that 
media often provides a better overview of the current opinions than individual 
politicians do. In addition, research has shown that the media played an important role 
in the shaping of public opinion in the 1994 EU-referenda.40 Thirdly, popular votes are 
unusual in the Nordic countries, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the 
referenda generated lively debates. The voters were in need of information to be able to 
form their opinions.  
 
The editorial pages are primarily a place where newspapers provide their analyses on 
current issues, but to a lesser extent they also give other voices the opportunity of being 
heard, for example in the form of guest columns or press cuttings. By analysing the 
editorial pages in Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, Swedish newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter and Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten one month before each referendum, I 
therefore hope to answer the following question: 
- How was Norden presented in the editorial pages of the three Nordic 
newspapers Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten prior to the 
1994 EU-referenda in Finland, Sweden and Norway? 
The supplementary questions are: 
- How was Norden used as an argument in the discussion of joining the EU? 
- Was Norden viewed differently in the three countries? 
- How was Nordic identity visible in the editorial pages? 
Concepts 
Since one of the research questions is to investigate if there were references to Nordic 
identity in the sources, I find it useful to provide a definition of the concept identity. The                                                         
39 See Wæver, Ole (1992a): Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War. In International 
Affairs, vol. 68 (1).; Joenniemi 1994a; Joenniemi 1994b 
40 See for example Kivikuru, Ullamaija (ed.) (1996): Kansa euromyllyssä. Journalismi, kampanjat ja 
mediamaisemat Suomen EU-jäsenyysprosessissa. Yliopistopaino, Helsinki. 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definitions of identity vary between, and within, different academic disciplines. There 
are also differences between individual and collective identities; there are national 
identities; regional identities; personal; vocational and sexual identities to mention a 
few. Generally speaking though, one could say, and as Steph Lawler also points out, 
that identity is about sameness and difference.41 To identify with one group is, at the 
same time, to differentiate from another group. For instance, Stuart Hall argues that 
identities are constructed within discourse and through difference.42 With this he means 
that identities are products of certain discourses, which differ according to the historical 
time and situation, and secondly, that identities are constructed in relation to what they 
are not. The division between “We” and the “Others” creates a common feeling of unity 
inside the We-group even though disunity also might exist within the We-group. Or as 
Hall puts it, “identities can function as points of identification and attachment only 
because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected”.43 
Knowing the Other and the boundaries surrounding it is therefore needed to know the 
Self and the self’s boundaries. As already suggested by Hall, identities are 
constructions. They do not exist by themselves. Neither are identities constant; they are 
regularly subject of construction and reconstruction. Finnish philosopher Arto Mutanen 
writes: 
“Explicating identity is a process of construction. The explication is a continuous process 
which has to be done over and over again to maintain the identity. The maintaining means 
not merely preserving the identity but also renewing it”.44 
Thus, identifying with a certain group can mean different things at different times. From 
a sociological point of view, Steph Lawler argues that identities are socially produced. 
This happens through events like narratives, kin networks, and governance and 
interpellation. She claims that identities must be negotiated collectively and conform to 
social rules.45 One person, group or why not state, can also have several identities. 
According to Lawler, these different identities “should be seen as interactive and 
mutually constitutive, rather than ‘additive’”. She also points out that tension between 
different identities is possible.                                                         
41 Lawler, Steph (2008): Identity. Sociological perspectives. Polity Press, Cambridge, Malden, 2. 
42 Hall, Stuart (2000): Who needs ’identity’? In du Gay, Paul – Evans, Jessica – Redman, Peter (ed.). 
Identity: A Reader. SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 17. 
43 Hall, 18. 
44 Mutanen, Arto (2010): About the Notion of Identity. In LIMES, Vol. 3, No. 1, 28. 
45 Lawler, 143. 
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1.4 Sources 
 
My empirical material is collected from three major Nordic daily newspapers: Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS), Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Aftenposten (AP). The reason for choosing 
these newspapers is because they have a similar profile and status in their countries, 
which makes a comparison of them relevant. I have chosen to concentrate my research 
on daily newspapers, although in some countries some evening papers had bigger 
circulations. This decision is motivated by a general assumption that daily newspapers 
stand for a more nuanced and less sensational approach than evening papers do. The 
similarities between my newspapers are many. They were all among the biggest daily 
newspapers in their countries in 1994 and they are known for providing professional 
journalism. They appear seven days a week and they are all based in the capital city of 
their country: Helsingin Sanomat in Helsinki, Dagens Nyheter in Stockholm and 
Aftenposten in Oslo. All three newspapers were pro-EU and they clearly informed their 
readers of this in their editorials. As major dailies in their respective countries, the 
newspapers did, however, try to provide a nuanced coverage of the EU-debate. Taking 
these factors into consideration, these newspapers assumingly played an important role 
in framing the EU-debate. Below is a short description of each of the newspapers. 
 
Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 
Helsingin Sanomat is by large the biggest newspaper in Finland. In 1994, it had a 
circulation of 475,910 on weekdays and 564,396 on Sundays.46 HS was founded in 
1889 and the political tendency of the newspaper is independent. In 1994, Janne 
Virkkunen was chief editor and the newspaper was owned by the media group Sanomat 
Osakeyhtiö. HS has a dominant role in the Helsinki-area as well as in Finland as a 
whole. In this respect, HS differs somewhat from DN and AP, in that the two latter face 
constant competition from other newspapers in their respective area. Next to Helsingin 
Sanomat, the biggest newspapers in Finland in 1994 were Aamulehti in Tampere and 
Turun Sanomat in Turku as well as the two evening papers Ilta-Sanomat and Iltalehti. 
After the biggest competitor to HS in the Helsinki-area, the conservative newspaper 
Uusi Suomi, was discontinued in 1991, HS strengthened its role in the capital city even 
                                                        
46 Levikintarkastus Oy (2012): Inspection manager Olli Aaltonen at the Finnish Audit Bureau of 
Circulations to Madeleine Nygrund February 10, 2012, 07:43. Email ”Levikkitietoja” (in Nygrund’s 
possession). 
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further.47 The data collected from HS starts on October 16, 1994, which was the day of 
the Finnish referendum. From this date, the collected material goes back to September 
19, 1994. To be able to say something about how Helsingin Sanomat covered the 
Swedish and Norwegian referenda, I have also included the days of the referenda in the 
two countries plus two days after the respective referendum, that is November 13–15, 
1994 and November 28–30 1994. In total, I have collected 34 days of material from HS. 
 
Dagens Nyheter (DN) 
Dagens Nyheter was the biggest Swedish daily newspaper in 1994, with a circulation of 
379,700 during weekdays and 429,600 on Sundays.48 The evening paper Expressen had 
a bigger circulation than DN on both weekdays and Sundays and the other evening 
paper, Aftonbladet, had a bigger circulation than DN on Sundays, but as mentioned 
earlier, in this research I only focus on daily newspapers. Other big Swedish newspapers 
were Göteborgsposten, Idag and Svenska Dagbladet. Dagens Nyheter was founded in 
1864 and the political tendency of the newspaper is independent. The media group 
Bonnier AB owns DN and in 1994, Christina Jutterström was chief editor and holder of 
the publication licence. In Sweden the EU-referendum was held on November 13, 1994. 
My collected material starts from that date and goes back until October 16, 1994. 
Consequently, the Swedish material also covers the Finnish referendum on October 16. 
In addition to this, I have included the day of the Norwegian referendum and two days 
after the referendum, that is November 28-30, 1994. There was no DN published on 
Saturday, November 5, because of All Saint’s Day. In total, I have collected 31 days of 
material from DN. 
 
Aftenposten (AP) 
Aftenposten was the biggest subscribed daily newspaper in Norway in 1994. The 
newspaper, which was founded in 1860, comes out in two editions; in 1994 the morning 
edition had a circulation of 279,965 and the evening edition a circulation of 188,544.49 
The daily newspaper Verdens Gang (VG) had a larger circulation than Aftenposten in 
1994, but VG was mostly sold in single copies. Aftenposten is commonly referred to as 
the biggest serious Norwegian newspaper, due to VG:s somewhat sensationalist 
approach to news. Both Aftenposten and VG are owned by the media group Schibsted.                                                         
47 Uppslagsverket Finland (2012): Uusi Suomi, website. 
48 Kungliga Biblioteket (2012): Dagstidningar efter 1900 – Kungliga biblioteket, website. 
49 Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (2012): Samletabell opplag fra 1994, Excel file on website. 
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Other big Norwegian newspapers are Dagbladet and Bergens Tidende. In 1994, the 
chief editor of Aftenposten was Einar Hanseid. The political tendency of the newspaper 
is liberal conservative. My data from AP starts on November 28, 1994, the day of the 
Norwegian referendum and goes back until November 1, 1994. This material covers the 
Swedish referendum on November 13, but not the Finnish referendum on October 16. I 
have therefore decided to add the day of the Finnish referendum and two days after the 
referendum, that is October 16-18, 1994. In total, I have collected 31 days of material 
from AP. 
 
The purpose of editorial pages is, according to Swedish media researcher Lars Nord, to 
offer the readers the most important and most thoroughly revised texts of the day.50 
What differs editorial articles from other news articles is that editorials have a clear 
standpoint on matters and they often try to create opinions and provide 
recommendations.51 Analysing editorial pages is especially interesting in connection to 
popular votes, since the people, more than in other elections, are in need of information 
and opinions to be able to decide how to vote. Editorial pages often have a fixed placing 
in the newspapers, so that readers easily can find the page. In 1994, this was the case 
with both Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter, as the editorial page was always 
found on page A2. In Aftenposten, the placement of the editorial page differed from day 
to day. Since Aftenposten comes out in both a morning edition and an evening edition, I 
have decided to only include the editorial pages of the morning edition. Editorial pages 
normally consist of different elements, such as editorial texts, guest columns, and 
cartoons, to mention a few. I have decided to include all parts of the editorial pages in 
my material and not to make a difference between texts written by the newspaper’s own 
staff and for example guest columns or press cuttings from other newspapers. One could 
argue that the latter kinds of texts do not represent the position of the newspapers. In my 
view, however, it is more important to provide an overall analysis of the editorial pages. 
When referring to a text written by an external writer, I will make this clear to the 
readers. Besides, even if not all guest columnists agree with the official position of the 
newspapers, it is the newspapers themselves who have chosen their columnists and they 
                                                        
50 Nord, Lars (2000): Vår tids ledare. En studie av den svenska dagspressens politiska opinionsbildning. 
Carlsson bokförlag, Stockholm, 54. 
51 Nord, 56. 
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can always ultimately refuse to publish a text, which is too much in contrast with their 
own opinions. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
The method used in this study is content analysis with a qualitative, descriptive and 
comparative approach. Content analysis has traditionally been an important method in 
communication research. One of the most well known authors of books on content 
analysis methodology, Klaus Krippendorff, characterizes content analysis as a method, 
which is empirically grounded, exploratory in process and predictive or inferential in 
intent.52 This means that the analyst empirically gathers the data, which is being 
analysed. The most common data are texts, which also are the main analytical units in 
this thesis. The analyst wants to explain his or her data and provide the data with a 
meaning. The analyst also wants to draw conclusions out of the material. I will therefore 
not only provide a quantitative presentation of the results, but also describe the data in 
depth and try to provide meanings and generalisations concerning the sources. I will 
also compare the coverage of Norden in the three different newspapers. 
 
To facilitate the analysis of the editorial pages, the different elements of the pages have 
been divided into analytical units, where an analytical unit is defined as a well-defined 
text, photograph or cartoon. For an analytical unit to become relevant in this study it has 
to refer to Norden or at least two Nordic countries and, in addition to this, it has to be 
situated in a EU-referenda context. Those units, which do not cover both the EU-
referenda and Norden in some way, offer no answer to my research questions and will 
therefore not be taken into consideration. For example, an article published in Dagens 
Nyheter about a domestic issue in Finland will not qualify as a Nordic editorial. The 
main focus in such an editorial is on a domestic issue, even though the mere fact that the 
issue was published in another Nordic newspaper gives it an element of Nordicness. I 
have, however, decided that the element of Nordicness is not enough. If the domestic 
issue is believed to have consequences for another Nordic country or Norden as a 
whole, it will, on the other hand, be included. Figure 1 below gives an example of what 
a typical editorial page from Aftenposten looks like. This particular page has five well-
                                                        
52 Krippendorff, Klaus (2000): Content Analysis: an Introduction to Its Methodology. Sage Publications 
Inc., Thousand Oaks, xvii. 
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defined texts and one photograph. More precisely, the page consists of one long 
editorial text, one short editorial text, one photograph and three columns or 
commentaries. The texts may consist of sub-parts such as headlines, introductions, the 
actual texts, citations, picture by-lines, and presentations of the writers. I have, however, 
decided to include all these sub-parts into the same analytical unit, which I call a text.  
This decision is motivated by the goal to gain an overall picture of the content on the 
editorial pages. The same principle is applied to photographs and cartoons, as the 
caption below the picture is analysed together with the picture. A cartoon or 
photograph, which illustrates a text will be analysed together with its text and will be 
coded according to the type of text it illustrates. A cartoon or photograph standing on its 
own will, on the other hand, be analysed as a separate unit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the relevant analytical units have been gathered, I will continue by coding the 
different units. To codify is, according to Johnny Saldaña, “to arrange things in a 
Figure 1. Editorial page from Aftenposten, November 7, 1994, page 14. 
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systematic order, to make something part of a system or classification, to categorize”.53 
Different qualitative researchers apply different methods to code their material. The 
code schedule I have developed ask questions including where and when the articles 
were published, the title and what kind of analytical unit they are, who produced them, a 
description and analysis of the units and what the themes and frames in the texts were. 
The code schedule is attached as an appendix in the end of this thesis. The main goal of 
the coding process is to find out in which circumstances Norden was present and which 
the attitudes towards Norden were.  
                                                        
53 Saldaña, Johnny (2000): The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. SAGE Publications Ltd, 
London, 8. 
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2 The Nordic presence in the media 
The main arguments in the EU-referenda debate in the Nordic countries focused on 
matters like the economy, the jobs, the countries’ right of self-determination and the 
security policy. Norden is generally not mentioned as one of the hot topics in the EU-
debate, but my research of editorial pages in Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and 
Aftenposten shows that the Nordic aspect was a highly salient feature in the debate 
during the last month before the elections. The amount of editorial articles mentioning 
Norden in some way ranged from 22 to 39 in the three newspapers during the last 
month before each referendum. On average, this means about one editorial article per 
day, dealing with Norden. This chapter begins by presenting the frequency of editorials 
articles dealing with Norden in the three newspapers. It will then go on to describing 
through which subjects Norden was presented (themes) and which the attitudes were in 
the articles covering Norden (frames). 
 
2.1 Norden a frequent feature in the newspaper editorials 
The highest amount of editorial articles mentioning Norden was found in Helsingin 
Sanomat. When taking into consideration the criteria that an analytical unit should 
include a mention of both Norden and the EU-referenda in some way, the total amount 
of analytical units found in the material was 39. Some days there were no mentions of 
Norden; other days there were two or even three units about Norden. The analysed units 
differed from pure editorial articles, columns, guest columns, press cuttings and 
cartoons. No relevant photographs were found in the material. The units were divided as 
showed in Table 1.  
 
As the table shows, the units mentioning Norden in Helsingin Sanomat were a mix of 
the newspaper’s own material and external texts like guest columns and press cuttings 
from other newspapers. In the case of HS, the editorial page was clearly not only used 
as a way of presenting the newspaper’s own perception, but also as a way of mirroring 
the debate in the society. The high amount of press cuttings from other newspapers 
distinguished HS somewhat from the other two newspapers. However, the press 
cuttings in HS were generally short, while in Dagens Nyheter they were longer but 
fewer. Aftenposten did not publish any press cuttings on Norden at all. The total amount 
of analytical units in HS was, as mentioned, 39. It was the highest number of units in 
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the three newspapers analysed, which shows that Norden was a frequent topic in HS. 
However, the amount of analysed days was in the case of Helsingin Sanomat 34, while 
it was 31 in the case of Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten. This fact might have 
influenced on the higher amount of units in HS. 
 
 
Dagens Nyheter did not cover Norden as frequently as Helsingin Sanomat did, out of 31 
editorial pages, the total amount of relevant units rose to 22. Moreover, DN did not 
publish as many press cuttings or guest columns as HS did, which indicates that the DN 
editorial page was more sacred to its own journalists than external moulders of public 
opinion. This might be a reflection of the two newspapers’ different statuses. While 
Helsingin Sanomat held a strong position as the by far biggest Finnish newspaper, 
Dagens Nyheter was in a position where it had to compete with several other 
newspapers of approximately the same size. This fact may have led DN to differentiate 
itself from its competitors by developing an own, clear voice, displayed at the editorial 
pages. 
 
Many themes discovered were the same in DN and HS. Interestingly enough though, 
some of the themes were referred to as something typical Nordic in HS, while in DN 
they were referred to as typical Swedish. Since the Nordic dimension was one criterion 
Table 1. The analytical units in Helsingin Sanomat. 
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when sorting out the analytical units, these texts could not be included in the DN 
material. That is one important reason why the units in DN were fewer. The difference 
in referring to matters as typical Nordic or typical Swedish is in any case an interesting 
observation and I will return to this finding later on. The photographs and cartoons in 
DN all illustrated domestic or international issues, no Nordic matters. Table 2 shows the 
division of analytical units in Dagens Nyheter. 
 
 
In the last newspaper, Aftenposten, 32 units on Norden were found, out of the 31 
editorial pages. Norden was mainly discussed in the newspaper’s own editorial texts and 
in the commentaries written by the journalists of the newspaper. Aftenposten did not 
publish any press cuttings from other newspapers like HS and DN did, and the amount 
of guest columns was also scarce. From a media landscape point of view, Aftenposten 
was in a similar position as Dagens Nyheter, as it competed against several other 
Norwegian newspapers of similar size and status. The theory that this kind of situation 
forces newspapers to concentrate on a strong, own opinion displayed in the editorial 
pages therefore seems to hold true. The large amount of long editorial texts gives a hint 
that the newspaper viewed it necessary to provide long and detailed standpoints on the 
approaching referendum. This could be connected with the fact that the Norwegians 
were the most sceptical towards the EU out of the Nordics and that the newspaper, as a 
Table 2. The analytical units in Dagens Nyheter. 
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pronounced Yes-paper, felt a responsibility to try to convince its readers to vote Yes. 
Aftenposten also distinguishes itself by its many, often satirical cartoons. Two cartoons 
had a Nordic dimension in them and are therefore included in the material. Table 3 
below shows how the analytical units in Aftenposten were divided. 
 
 
 
2.2 The thematic use and the portrayal of Norden 
As the tables above show, Norden was a frequent feature in the newspaper debate. But 
since Norden is such a broad concept it is not really comparable with other, individual 
topics in the debate, like the jobs or the environment. Rather, Norden was visible as a 
catchall dimension, embracing different topics but in the same time standing above the 
thematic level of discussion. While reading through the analytical units mentioning both 
Norden and the EU-referenda there were, however, certain themes that recurred over 
and over again. A typical theme was for example Nordic cooperation or Nordic values. 
In addition to the themes, Norden was also portrayed differently in the articles. One 
editorial article about Nordic cooperation could portray cooperation in a nostalgic way, 
while another article about the same theme could refer to the benefits of Nordic 
cooperation. I have chosen to call the different ways of portraying Norden the frame of 
the article. Framing is a common concept in media research, especially in the news 
Table 3. The analytical units in Aftenposten. 
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framing theory. According to the theory, news media has the power of framing debates 
by highlighting some perspectives of an argument and as a consequence, by leaving out 
some other perspectives. Robert M. Entman describes the theory as follows:  
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.54 
I have been somewhat inspired by the news framing theory, but the themes and frames 
developed in this research are unique for this study as they have arisen inductively from 
the sources. Together they provide a two-dimensional way of looking at the sources, as 
they tell us in which thematic circumstances Norden was mentioned as well as which 
the inward sense or the essence of the articles mentioning Norden was. As Table 4 here 
below shows, a total of eight themes and seven frames were found in the articles. The 
same theme could be presented through different frames. 
 
 
 
                                                         
54 Entman, M. Robert (1993): Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. In Journal of 
Communication, 43(4), 52. 
Table 4. The themes and frames discovered in the newspaper material. 
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The following definitions show the characteristics of each theme and frame. 
Themes 
Values 
The editorial articles coded according to this theme ascribed Norden with certain values. 
These values included openness, democracy, equality, a high level of social welfare, 
solidarity, and a concern for the environment, among others. These values were thought 
to have a special Nordic dimension in them and in other places in the world, these 
values were not thought to be as important as they were in Norden.  
 
Cooperation 
This theme dealt with Nordic cooperation, both in the meaning of concrete cooperation 
on a certain issue and through ideas of a Nordic union or a Nordic bloc. The opinions on 
whether this Nordic cooperation would succeed better inside the EU or on the outside 
diverged in the debate.   
 
Unity 
This theme was often expressed through a feeling rather than something concrete. But 
the unity-aspect was also expressed through words like “brother”, “closest neighbours” 
and especially in the case of Norway through a fear of division and isolation from its 
Nordic neighbours. 
 
Economy 
This topic dealt with the economic consequences of joining or not joining the European 
Union and the Nordic countries’ influence on each other’s economies. This was, for 
example, done through comparisons between the Nordic countries as well as 
discussions on the consequences of another Nordic country’s actions. 
 
Security policy 
Editorial articles coded according to this theme discussed the new geopolitical situation 
and the consequences of it on the security policy in Norden. The future of the Swedish 
and Finnish neutrality was discussed within this theme, as well as Norway’s 
membership in Nato. Future security cooperation between the Nordic countries was 
discussed both in a EU-context and outside of the EU. 
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Influence 
This theme is twofold. On the one hand, the editorials in this theme discussed the 
possibilities of the Nordic countries to influence on the politics within the European 
Union, by, for example, coordinating all the Nordic votes in order to get a bill of Nordic 
interest passed. On the other hand, this theme discussed the Nordic influence internally 
in Norden, especially the influence the Nordic countries had on each other’s EU-
campaigns. The results or the expected results of the three Nordic EU-referenda were 
salient features in the editorials of all three countries.  
 
Religion 
This theme was quite rare, but a few articles discussed the Church’s role in the EU-
referenda and compared how the Churches in Norway, Sweden and Finland handled the 
EU-question. 
 
Environment 
Quite a few articles mentioned the environment as an important Nordic value, but not so 
many articles had environment as the dominant theme. Those articles, which were 
coded with environment as the dominant theme, discussed whether Nordic 
environmental goals could be best achieved inside or outside of the EU. 
 
Frames 
Point of reference 
This frame portrayed Norden as the natural point of reference. Whenever Finland, 
Sweden or Norway was brought up against a problem or question, another Nordic 
country was pointed out as a reference or as an example to follow. 
 
Conflict 
The essence in this frame was conflict. It could be a disagreement between Yes- and 
No-supporters concerning the EU-matter, a conflict between Norden and the EU or 
between different values. The editorials coded according to this frame could also 
present contradicting ideas of a theme, like for example the future of the Nordic 
cooperation.  
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Responsibility 
The responsibility frame was noticed in several different circumstances. The Nordic 
countries were for example given the responsibility by the editorial articles to change 
the EU from the inside and to bring Nordic values to the EU. Another aspect of the 
responsibility-frame was that the Nordics ought to join the EU so that the Baltic 
countries would have a chance to join later; the Nordics should according to this frame 
help the Baltic countries from the inside of the EU. A third frame of responsibility was 
connected to solidarity with the international society. Some believed that solidarity was 
best achieved outside the EU; others believed the Nordic countries could help Third 
World countries better from inside the EU. 
 
Nostalgia vs. changes 
This frame presented the EU-referenda as a crossroads, where the Nordic countries had 
to choose between holding on to an old, nostalgic reality or realising that Europe and 
Norden had changed or was about to change.  
 
Fear vs. courage 
This frame is closely connected to the previous one, but still worth an own frame. For 
example, many editorials in Aftenposten were filled with fear of what would happen 
with Norway if it remained outside the union, isolated from its closest neighbours. 
Dagens Nyheter framed the Finnish Yes-vote as a courageous decision and advised its 
readers to follow the Finnish neighbours.  
 
Self-esteem 
The editorials coded with this frame touched upon the different Nordic countries’ belief 
in themselves and their possibilities to achieve things either within or outside of the EU.  
 
Benefits 
This frame highlighted the benefits the Nordic countries would get if they decided to 
work on an issue together. The spirit of this frame was that one Nordic country is strong 
but three, four or even five Nordic countries are even stronger. The opposite of this 
frame is consequently what happens if the Nordic countries chose different paths. 
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It should be said straight away that a clear-cut division of the editorial articles according 
to the different themes and frames has not been easy, since most articles contain several 
themes and frames of nearly equal importance. These articles have been coded 
according to the most dominant theme and frame. This choice is, however, dependent 
on my personal adjustments and although I have recoded parts of the material to check 
the reliability, qualitative choices are always qualitative choices. For that reason, the 
disposition of the frequency of each theme and frame in the three newspapers, as 
presented in Table 5 and Table 6, does not really do justice to the content of the articles 
and the results will therefore be more qualitatively discussed in the next chapter. 
Generally though, one could say that Nordic values and cooperation were the two 
predominant themes in Helsingin Sanomat, closely followed by articles on Nordic 
unity. In Dagens Nyheter, the themes were rather evenly divided, while in Aftenposten 
most articles dealt with Nordic influence and unity. Since the Norwegians were the last 
ones to cast their votes, it is not surprising that many articles dealt with the results of the 
Finnish and Swedish referenda and that the share of articles with influence as the theme 
therefore was high. The high amount of articles dealing with values, cooperation and 
unity in the Finnish case, is most likely an expression of the country’s desire to profile 
itself as a Western country with similar values as the other Nordic countries. 
 
Table 5. The frequency of different Nordic themes in the three newspapers. 
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The figure on the Nordic frames below shows that point of reference was a frequent 
frame in Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten. All three countries thus 
turn to their neighbours for advice and support. Nostalgia vs. changes was a common 
frame, especially in Finland, but also in Norway. The Finnish discourse did concentrate 
much on the fact that for the first time ever the country could decide on its own destiny, 
without being hold back by any agreements with the Soviet Union, or by this time, 
Russia. 
 
 
The problem with these kinds of dispositions though, is that one easily gets the 
impression that economy was not at all a Nordic theme in Helsingin Sanomat or in 
Aftenposten or that there were no articles dealing with the conflict-frame in Dagens 
Nyheter. In reality, Nordic economy was a visible theme both in HS and AP and there 
were conflicts in Dagens Nyheter, but in those articles where they appeared, there were 
other themes and frames, which were stronger, and therefore the article has been coded 
according to the more dominant theme. In the following chapter, the analysis continues 
with a more qualitative approach.  
 
 
Table 6. The frequency of different Nordic frames in the three newspapers. 
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3 A new Norden in a new Europe 
The dramatic changes in Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s had consequences 
for Norden as well. In the new geopolitical situation, Europe was no longer divided into 
two, but instead the European Communities and later the European Union grew even 
stronger. While the old division during the Cold War had enabled Norden to hold a 
favourable position in the middle of capitalism and communism, it was uncertain what 
the new situation would carry along. The Nordic countries were economically 
increasingly dependent on the EU and they also wished to join the tables where the 
decisions in Europe were made. The 1994 EU-referenda became the turning points for 
the Nordic countries’ approach to the European integration, but the referenda results 
also made them into turning points in the Nordic reality. After the Finns and Swedes 
had voted Yes to the EU, the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland said 
that these Yes-votes would make 1994 to a memorable year in Nordic and European 
history.55 She hoped that Norway would follow its neighbours into the EU, but this did 
not happen. With the dramatic changes in Europe in mind and the uncertain time that 
followed, I will now take a closer look at how Norden was presented in the newspapers 
editorials prior to three Nordic EU-referenda. I will discuss the findings of my research 
and compare them with earlier writings. The themes and frames presented in the 
previous chapter will be discussed more in detail together with examples from the 
source material. The rest of the chapter is divided into three subchapters, each 
presenting some of the themes and some of the frames. The subchapters are in the same 
time parts of my results and in this chapter I will therefore argue that 1) Norden never 
lost value for the Nordics but simply fell out of fashion when the EU became a more 
attractive alternative, 2) The Nordic interdependence remained strong although the 
Nordic reality was shaken, 3) The belief that Norden was better than the Others still 
prevailed. 
 
3.1 Norden valuable but not fashionable  
For the Nordic countries, Norden never stopped being important although Norden’s 
position in the world was somewhat weakened with the end of the Cold War. The 
problem for Norden was, however, that the EU took over a lot of its attention and 
                                                        
55 Gro Harlem Brundtland, cited in ”Norge ved skilleveien” in Aftenposten, November 16, 1994, 14. 
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attractiveness. Norden was still valuable but no longer fashionable.56 This was seen 
already in the campaigns prior to the referenda, but even more after the accession of 
Finland and Sweden in the EU. The EU became, as Pertti Joenniemi expressively 
formulates it, the “new master narrative”57. The weaker position of Norden was for 
example manifested through a decreased interest for Nordic cooperation. In a report 
from the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Institutes of International Affairs 
and the University in Reykjavik from 1991, the director of the Norwegian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Sverre Jervell wrote: 
“Parts of the Nordic cooperation-apparatus is politically ticking over and the media-interest 
for the Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers is limited. The Nordic politicians 
still care about Nordic cooperation, but they bring it more goodwill than political will. It is 
not an expression of deliberately giving the Nordic lesser priority, but rather a consequence 
of the fact that politicians and media are now focusing on the EC and the EEA”.58 (My 
translation) 
The institutionalized Nordic cooperation, with the Nordic Council from 1952 and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers from 1971 as the two main bodies, had in the early 1990s 
lost both significance and the ability to take action. The golden age59 when the Nordic 
passport union (1952) and the Nordic labour market (1954) were created and the 
Helsinki agreement, which stipulates the official Nordic cooperation, came into force 
(1962) was long gone. The attempt to create a Nordic defence union had failed already 
in 1948 and the Nordic economic cooperation, Nordek, failed in 1970. Instead, Nordic 
cooperation was associated with so called soft policy areas, like culture and the 
environment. With the possibility of suddenly having not only one Nordic country in 
the EU, but possibly four Nordic countries, it was clear that the EU-referenda, whatever 
the outcome would be, would have an impact on the future Nordic cooperation. Some 
felt that the EU posed a threat against the Nordic cooperation, while others saw the EU 
as an additional arena for cooperation between the Nordic countries.                                                         
56  See Joenniemi, Pertti (1992): Norden as a Mystery. The Search for New Roads into the Future. In 
Øberg, Jan (ed.). Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe. Pinter Publishers, 
London. 
57 Joenniemi 1992, 74. 
58 Jervell, Sverre (1991): Elementer i en ny nordisk arkitektur. In Norden i det nye Europa. En rapport fra 
de fire nordiske utenrikspolitiske instituttene og universitetet i Reykjavik. Helsingfors, København, Oslo, 
Reykjavik, Stockholm, 189. 
59 This term was coined by Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund. They describe the three main tracks of 
Nordic cooperation, from the late 1940s to the turn of the millennium, in Sundelius, Bengt – Wiklund, 
Claes (ed.) (2000). 
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In my material there were several newspaper editorials dealing with Nordic cooperation. 
However, my research shows that the strongest support for strengthened Nordic 
cooperation was found among the EU-sceptics. Especially Finnish politician Paavo 
Väyrynen talked warmly about a Nordic union as an alternative to the European Union. 
The same Väyrynen also made himself known in the other Nordic countries by giving a 
marathon speech in the Finnish Parliament in order to postpone the Parliament’s final 
approval of the Finnish Yes-vote until after the Swedish referendum had been held.  But 
Väyrynen’s idea of a Nordic union was criticised among the EU-supporters, who 
generally looked upon the idea as a joke. In a press cutting from the Finnish newspaper 
Kouvolan Sanomat, published in Helsingin Sanomat, Väyrynen’s proposal of a Nordic 
union was described as a utopian fantasy, 
“[w]here an illusion of a new impressive Nordic cooperation is painted with all the colours 
of the rainbow”. 
(“Ruotsin vaalitulos”, press cutting from Kouvolan Sanomat, published in Helsingin 
Sanomat on September 21, 1994, page A2.) 
In another column published in Helsingin Sanomat, the newspaper’s own journalist 
Erkki Pennanen gives a critical view of Nordic cooperation: 
“The Nordic countries have much more in common between them than between the EU-
countries. The big concrete achievements of the Nordic cooperation have, however, been 
few since the passport freedom and the creation of the free labour market. (…) The European 
cooperation drove past the Nordic one. The interest of the Nordic countries shifted to 
develop the cooperation in broader European forums. A return to the Nordic cooperation 
would be a step back, which hardly would interest anybody.” 
(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”?”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 
27, 1994, page A2.) 
Väyrynen’s kind of understanding of Nordic cooperation was consequently framed as 
nostalgic and reactionary. This verdict fits well with a passage written by Pertti 
Joenniemi already in 1992: “Norden has connotations referring to the past rather than 
the future, and it provides a weak shelter against changing conditions in Europe”.60 
 
                                                        
60 Joenniemi 1992, 78. 
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Most editorials were, however, not negatively inclined towards Nordic cooperation, but 
they believed that a deepened cooperation could only be achieved within the European 
Union. As guest columnist Anna Christensen, professor in civil law in Lund, wrote in 
Dagens Nyheter two days before the Swedish referendum: 
“Certainly, one can regret that the Nordic countries did not manage to create a stronger 
common political organization. But that train has already left the station. Denmark is already 
member of the EU since many years back and Finland has already voted yes. If we shall be 
able to carry through common Nordic politics in the future, it has to be done within the 
broader political frame, which the EU constitutes.” 
(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter November 
11, 1994, page A2.) 
Future Nordic cooperation was thus framed as something that needed to be changed to 
fit the new reality, but no one wanted to completely end the cooperation. Instead, the 
view shared by all three newspapers was that Nordic cooperation could continue to live 
inside the European Union. Nordic cooperation was also portrayed through the benefit-
frame. If Finland, Sweden and Norway cooperate with Denmark, who joined the EU 
already in 1973, then the Nordic benefits inside the EU would become much bigger. 
Behind this frame lies an assumption that the Nordic countries share the same interests 
and priorities, which in most cases is true, but not always. After the Finnish Yes-vote, 
and later the Swedish ditto, the idea of a Nordic union outside of the EU eventually 
became impossible, and a strengthened cooperation within the EU was seen as the only 
option. After the Finnish and the Swedish referenda, the Norden-card was used more 
than ever by the Yes-supporters in Norway. The day after the Swedish Yes-vote, one 
editorial article in Aftenposten said: 
“It is now up to the Norwegian people to decide, whether we also should participate in the 
deepening of the Nordic cooperation within the broader, European frame. And it is up to us 
to decide, whether a gathered Norden shall make a contribution to the shaping of the future 
Europe”. 
(“Overbevisende ja-flertall”, long editorial article, published in Aftenposten November 14, 
1994, page 14.) 
The courage vs. fear-frame was used more often in Aftenposten than in the other two 
newspapers, especially during the last days before the Norwegian referendum, when it 
stood clear that the No-side still was in majority despite the Finnish and Swedish Yes-
 35 
votes. The fear of being left outside, or rather of choosing to stay outside, of both the 
European and the Nordic cooperation led to several editorial articles in Aftenposten 
about how Norden would be divided if the Norwegians chose to vote No. The editorials 
gave the impression that the Nordic cooperation had no future outside of the EU and 
that by turning down the EU, the Norwegians would also turn down the Nordic 
cooperation. 
“During fifty years, first the wars and later the east-west-tension has divided Norden. Now 
the geopolitical situation no longer puts obstacles in the way for a Nordic cooperation on 
foreign policy and defence, but possibly we ourselves.” 
(“Splittet Norden på EU-tog i fart?”, commentary, published in Aftenposten November, 17, 
1994, page 16.)  
In Norway, the attitudes towards Norden have been divided before. In the same 
commentary as cited above, Nils Morten Udgaard reminds the readers that those parties 
who were against the creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 are the same parties who 
are now against a Norwegian membership in the EU, namely the Centre Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party. He asks himself how important Norden actually is for 
Norway. The feeling mediated through the editorials in Aftenposten is that Norway 
should follow its Nordic neighbours into the EU. This recommendation is cleverly 
displayed in a satiric cartoon, published in Aftenposten on November 15. The cartoon, 
showed in Figure 2, is a picture of Norwegian Social Democratic Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, who was a pronounced Yes-supporter, and the “No-Queen” Anne 
Enger Lahnstein, leader of the Centre Party. Brundtland is portrayed as a big and 
important person looking down at poor Lahnstein, who is dressed in a traditional 
Norwegian folk costume, which gives the impression that Lahnstein stands for 
something old and nostalgic. In her hands, Brundtland carries a vacuum cleaner, whose 
mouthpiece is shaped as the contours of Norway. The motor of the vacuum cleaner is 
decorated with the characteristic EU-stars and a face of Jacques Delors, the President of 
the European Commission at the time. Lahnstein is picking up leaves from the ground, 
one by one, with a stick, while Brundtlands European vacuum cleaner gives the 
impression of being much more efficient. The caption underneath the cartoon says: “–Er 
det ikke på tide at du tar imot et Nordisk Råd?”, which in English would be: “–Is it not 
about time that you take a Nordic advice/Council?”. The Norwegian (and Swedish) 
word råd means both advice and council in English. Therefore the meaning of the 
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caption is double. Partly, the message is that Norway should take an advice from the 
other Nordic countries and join the EU, but since Nordisk Råd is written with capital 
letters in the beginning, it is also referring to the Nordic Council. The Centre Party, 
which Lahnstein represents, was against the creation of the Nordic Council in the 1950s 
and at the time of the Norwegian EU-referendum they were against the EU. The 
message here is to remind No-voters of how well the Nordic cooperation within the 
Nordic Council has turned out although the Centre Party was sceptical towards it in the 
beginning and secondly, to imply that the EU will turn out just as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The examples mentioned above might give the impression that the editorial articles 
frequently and systematically discussed the future of Nordic cooperation, but the truth is 
that not many concrete suggestions on how a deepened Nordic cooperation within the 
EU would look like, were made. Most editorials agreed that the Nordic countries would 
have a strong political impact inside the EU if they put their votes together and 
moreover, most of them agreed that the “Nordic interests” were to be defended. Matters 
concerning the environment, openness, equality and a concern for the Baltic countries 
were mentioned as possible Nordic priorities within the EU. But the editorials did not 
Figure 2. Cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 15, 1994, page 18. 
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mention any concrete plans for a Nordic programme within the union. This is further 
evidence to the claim that Norden was valuable but not fashionable. None of the 
editorials put too much time on outlining the future of the Nordic cooperation, but they 
all agreed that it was important and should be continued within the EU. Many 
researchers at the time suggested that the Nordic cooperation could be revitalised by 
including the Baltic countries in the cooperation. In his 1992 article, Nordic Nostalgia: 
Northern Europe after the Cold War, Ole Wæver suggests a Baltic rearticulation of 
Norden as the only option.61 To him, Norden represents the old and the Baltic the new. 
Moreover, cooperation in the Baltic region would not be state-based as the Nordic 
cooperation but include the whole region around the Baltic Sea. Thirdly, this new 
cooperation would create a growth region needed to manage in the economic 
competition in Europe.62  The Nordic Council of Ministers did open own offices in the 
Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1991,63 and cooperation between the 
Nordics and Baltics began, but this was not an option discussed in my sources. The 
editorials did express a concern for the Baltic neighbours, but none of the editorials 
suggested that the Nordic cooperation would be expanded to also include the Baltics. 
 
The countries voted for or against EU-membership on national grounds, not Nordic. 
The talks about Nordic cooperation could therefore only serve as a reinforcing 
argument. For the EU-supporters, the aim was to assure the voters that the Nordic 
countries would continue to accompany each other also inside the European Union. For 
the EU-opponents, on the other hand, Nordic cooperation was used as an alternative to 
the EU. I found it striking that, in Dagens Nyheter, the Nordic bloc within the EU was 
given more political weight after the Norwegians had voted No to EU-membership than 
during the campaigns. In an editorial article two days after the Norwegian vote, DN 
wrote: 
“One of the points with parallel membership-negotiations was to form a strong Nordic bloc 
with great opportunities to influence on the development of the EU. (…) The dream about an 
intensified Nordic cooperation within the frame of the union stays at a dream with Norway 
outside”.                                                         
61 Wæver 1992a, 96-97. 62 Wæver 1992a, 96-97. 
63 Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers (2012a): Nordic co-operation with Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, website.  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(“Landet Annorlunda utanför”, long editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter 
November 30, 1994, page A2.) 
If the editorials had talked more about what this Nordic bloc concretely could achieve 
prior to the referenda, and not after the referenda, the Norwegian results could have 
turned out differently. However, editorial articles usually comment on statements or 
actions made by politicians, and if the politicians did not go into detail on the plans of 
the Nordic bloc, then it is not surprising that the editorials did not either. One of the 
reasons why the plan of a Nordic bloc inside the EU was not developed as thoroughly as 
it could have, was perhaps that the Nordic politicians did not want to scare the other 
EU-members with far-reaching plans of a bloc that would make the Nordics very 
powerful. Bloc creations inside the EU are generally looked upon with disapproval. But, 
as already mentioned, the referenda were national referenda, not common Nordic ones. 
Nordic interests are valuable for the Nordic countries, but not more valuable than the 
national ones. If there is a conflict between Nordic and national values, the national will 
win. The Nordic aspect is nevertheless seen as a valuable additional level, between the 
national and international.  
 
3.2 The strong Nordic interdependence: All for one, one for all? 
Another finding I did from my sources was that although the new geopolitical situation 
in Europe and the changes that followed with it might have reduced Norden’s 
significance in Europe, the interdependence between the Nordic countries remained 
strong. The editorial articles frequently referred to Norden as a point of reference and a 
source of comparison. The point of reference-frame was by far the most common frame 
used in all three newspapers and Nordic unity was the most common theme in the 
articles dealing with Norden. This unity was expressed through feelings of a special 
togetherness, different from others, but also through a reference of the Nordic countries 
being united through similar society structures, values, experiences and preconditions. 
For instance, the editorial articles could refer to another Nordic country as “brother”, or 
“closest neighbour”. The cartoon in Figure 3 below is a perfect example of how Norden 
was viewed as a family. In the cartoon, which was published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
November 15, 1994, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are already sitting in the boat, 
wondering if Norway is joining them or not. Viking chief Hägar the Horrible is sitting 
on the bridge in the same position as Auguste Rodin’s sculpture The Thinker, pondering 
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over what to do. In his hands he has a mug of oil (not øl, the Norwegian word for beer). 
He seems to be wondering what is more important, to follow his family or to try to 
stand on his own feet? The reference to the comic-strip character Hägar the Horrible is 
inventive since it is a character that most readers are familiar with. In addition, it gives 
the impression that the Nordic family has existed since the Viking Age, which certainly 
is not true. It was not before the 1830s, after fighting several wars against each other, 
that a movement of cooperation between the three Scandinavian countries Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway started taking place. This pan-Scandinavian movement did not 
lead to any concrete institutions, but as time went by, it led to cooperation with cultural 
as well as vocational features.64 This movement could be seen as a precursor of the 
cooperation within the Association for Nordic Unity, created in 1919 and the 
institutionalised Nordic cooperation, developed in the early 1950s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the analysed editorial articles, the Danish experiences of the EU were naturally used 
as examples of how a future EU-membership could be. The EU-supporters claimed that 
a membership would not mean that the Nordic countries would have to lower their level 
of welfare and they pointed to Denmark as an example of a EU-country with high 
welfare standards. 
                                                        
64 See Hemstad, Ruth (2005): Skandinavismen og 1905. Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter. In Nordisk 
Tidsskrift för Vetenskap, Konst och Industri. Utgiven av Letterstedtska föreningen. VTT Grafiska 
Vimmerby, Stockholm, 2005, 81 (1). 
Figure 3. Cartoon published in Helsingin Sanomat on November 15, 1994, page A2. 
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“When we are frightened about losing our independence and our originality, about floods of 
foreigners and the collapse of our social security, it is worth looking towards Denmark. The 
EU has not crushed the Danish welfare model, neither has it brought flocks of free riders to 
the country to enjoy the high social security or to hoard everything they come across.” 
(“Tanskan uusi taudinmääritys”, press cutting from Aamulehti, published in Helsingin 
Sanomat September 24, 1994, page A2.) 
Denmark was also used as an example of how joining the EU does not mean that a 
country loses its right of self-determination and its identity. 
“[a]lso the No-side has to note that Denmark, despite many years of membership, is still a 
democracy where Folketinget65 still is influential, and still a country where one can enjoy 
smörrebröd66, red sausages and beer.” 
(“Debatt om EU gynnar jasidan”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter 
October 21, 1994, page A2.) 
Among Yes-supporters, Denmark served as an example of the possibility to combine a 
EU-membership with national and Nordic characteristics. EU was to them not a threat 
against the Nordic, but rather a complement or an additional level. The arguments of the 
No-side were also visible in the newspapers, but mainly when they were discussed and 
scrutinized by the journalists of the three newspapers in my material. The parallel to 
Denmark was, nevertheless, also seen among the EU-opponents. For instance, 
Norwegian Centre Party leader Anne Enger Lahnstein claimed that Finland and 
Sweden, similarly to Denmark, would cease to exist as independent countries after 
joining the EU. In this case, Denmark served as a bad example. 
 
Not only Denmark was used as a point of reference, comparisons were also made 
between the other Nordic countries. Especially the importance of the polls prior to the 
referenda and the results after the referenda were discussed. The No-side in the three 
countries had criticized the order of the three referenda, where the least sceptical Finns 
voted first, followed by the Swedes and leaving the most sceptical Norwegians to vote 
last. This order was thought to create a domino effect, where a Finnish Yes would result 
in a Swedish Yes, which in turn would lead to a Norwegian Yes. In the editorial pages, 
however, the opinions on this matter were divided. In a column in Helsingin Sanomat,                                                         
65 Folketinget is the Danish Parliament. Literally, Folketinget means the People’s Thing, thing being the 
governing assembly. 
66 Smörrebröd, or in Danish, Smørrebrød are famous Danish sandwiches. 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the newspaper’s own journalist Erkki Pennanen wrote that the opposition against the 
EU is so strong in Norway that a Finnish and Swedish membership hardly is enough to 
change the Norwegians’ minds. According to him, the Norwegians were ready to walk 
their own way without caring about the other Nordics. The membership in Nato and the 
country’s oil profits gave Norway totally other prerequisites than Finland and Sweden. 
Pennanen was critical against the old, outmoded cooperation within Norden, but 
believed that the possible EU-accessions would give new strength to Norden. He was 
upset over the fact that Sweden applied for EU-membership without first consulting or 
even informing Finland. 
“When Sweden submitted its EU-application, it did not inform Finland or Norway about it in 
advance. It wanted to secure the best place in the queue for itself. In the same way official 
Finland is ready to go its own way, even though Sweden and Norway would be left outside”. 
(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”? “, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 
27, 1994, page A2.) 
Certainly, the Nordic countries have not always been of the same opinion and have not 
had the same starting positions either. Norden consists of five different countries, but 
there exists a unity between them, which is not found between just any countries. If 
Finland was hurt because Sweden did not inform of its intention to apply for EU-
membership, then Finland was hurt because it felt closeness to Sweden and had wished 
that the countries would approach the EU together. But apart from unity, this is also an 
example of the interdependence between the countries. Decisions made by one Nordic 
country have consequences for the others. Norway would hardly have submitted its EU-
application in 1992 if it had not been for the Swedish and Finnish applications. The 
editorial articles that discussed this type of dependence were labelled with the 
influence-theme. Partly this theme was seen in articles lifting up how Norden could 
influence the rest of the EU, this aspect will be discussed further later on, but it was also 
seen in articles, which talked about how the Nordic countries influence each other 
internally. In this context, it was mainly the EU-candidates Finland, Sweden and 
Norway who influenced each other’s EU-campaigns, but as already mentioned the 
Danish experiences were also influential. 
 
In Finland, a long-lasting wish to finally become a part of Western Europe like the other 
Nordic countries was combined with the opportunity of finally deciding on its own 
 42 
destiny. After being hold back by the Fenno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance for several decades, the Finns were eager to join 
the EU, even though it meant diverging from Sweden and Norway. After the Finns had 
voted Yes to EU-membership on October 16, 1994, the debate in Dagens Nyheter was 
heavily concerned with the consequences of the Finnish Yes for Sweden. The tone in 
the editorial pages concerning the results was admiring, yet conscious. The little brother 
Finland had made a courageous decision and shown the way for Sweden. The courage 
vs. fear-frame was clearly visible. Now Sweden would have to follow Finland as not to 
lose status or economic benefits. Economy was a frequent theme in the Swedish articles 
after the Finnish referendum. The main concern applied to the forestry industry. With 
similar natural resources, Finland and Sweden were competitors in the forestry industry 
export market. After it became clear that Finland would join the EU, worried voices 
were raised in Sweden about the possible advantages the membership would mean for 
Finland.  
“For Swedish economy, it becomes even more evident that isolation is strange. Finnish 
forestry industry, the toughest competitor to the Swedish forestry industry, would be spared 
from time-consuming border controls during transports to the continent, while the problem 
would remain for the Swedish one. Unlike the Swedish one, the Finnish forestry industry 
would gain influence in the EU rules and regulations for forestry industries.” 
(“Nytt läge inför svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial, published in Dagens Nyheter 
October 18, 1994, page A2.) 
Also in Norway, the economy-theme was visible, but here the economic concerns were 
mainly related to a possible Swedish EU-membership. There was a fear that Norwegian 
companies would move their businesses to Sweden in the case that Sweden would join 
the union and Norway would vote No, and this would result in increased unemployment 
in Norway. This fear even had an own name, svenskesuget, which in English would be 
translated to the “Swedosuction” or the “Swedish sucking effect”. In practice, 
svenskesuget meant that Sweden would attract and absorb Norwegian companies. This 
concept was mainly used by the Yes-side to scare No-voters, while No-supporters tried 
to minimize the importance of svenskesuget. Such an attempt by No-supporter and party 
leader Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Democratic Party was in turn criticized in 
an editorial text in Aftenposten. 
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“Reality is also far away when Bondevik claims that it is important to note that 
«svenskesuget is psychology and not based on realities». Is there a more solid political 
reality for Norway today than the Swedish membership in the EU?” 
(“Bondevik”, short editorial, published in Aftenposten November 15, 1994, page 18.) 
Interestingly enough, the Nordic unity seldom seemed to stretch as far as to Iceland. 
The result of a No-vote in any of the three countries would mean a continued 
membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and cooperation through 
the European Economic Area (EEA). The tone in most of the editorials was, however, 
that it would be an unwished destiny to remain in the EFTA with leftover-countries like 
Iceland and Liechtenstein. Not even in the Norwegian newspaper were there any grand 
solidarity declarations towards Iceland, although Norway and Iceland have the vital 
fishing industry in common. On the whole, Iceland received very little attention in my 
material. Instead, the core or the motor of Norden was in many aspects concentrated to 
Sweden. Although the Finns were to hold their referendum first, the expected results of 
the Swedish referendum received a lot of attention in Finnish media. The influence-
theme was once again visible. In a press cutting from the Finnish newspaper Ilkka, 
published in Helsingin Sanomat, it says: 
“Finland’s position in the union or outside of the union naturally depends vitally on the 
Swedish position”.  
(“EU-keskustelusta sekamelskaa”, press cutting from Ilkka, published in Helsingin Sanomat 
on September 23, 1994, page A2.) 
This understanding was also common among the Swedes themselves. The author P.C 
Jersild, wrote in a guest column in Dagens Nyheter: 
“If I were a Finn I would also like Sweden to join the EU. It would feel safer with Sweden as 
backup and as a bridge down to Europe”. 
(“Från kol och stål till mjöl och fläsk”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter on 
November 6, 1994, page A2.) 
These examples show that some kind of Swedish guardianship over the rest of Norden 
still existed, although Finland stopped being a part of the Swedish realm in 1809 and the 
Union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved in 1905. Both Norway and Finland 
looked up to Sweden as two little brothers look up to their big brother. But although 
Sweden had submitted its EU-application first of the three countries, it was little brother 
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Finland who first approved of the negotiated membership-agreement. The old 
tendencies of Swedish superiority in Norden were still visible, but a reorientation was 
underway. After the Finnish Yes-vote, the editorial articles in Dagens Nyheter 
expressed pride over Finland’s courageous decision, but in the same time fear over 
Sweden’s position as the leading Nordic country being over. Especially during the Cold 
War, Sweden had felt a responsibility over its neighbour Finland, which held the less 
pleasant role as a buffer zone between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Sweden did not 
want to upset the Soviet Union, in case this latter would take out its irritation on 
Finland. After the Finnish Yes-vote, a Swedish No to European integration out of 
respect for Finland was no longer necessary. 
“A central element in Swedish neutrality policy – that we should sit still in the boat as not to 
create troubles around Finland – disappears when Finland itself searches also its security 
anchorage in the west”. 
(“Nytt läge inför den svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial article, published in Dagens 
Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.) 
Concerning the security policy in Norden, the situation changed somewhat when the 
Cold War ended. A redefinition of the concept neutrality made it possible for the neutral 
countries Sweden and Finland to apply for EU-membership, but the two countries 
continued to attach great weight to their policies of non-alignment. The security policy 
played an important role in especially the Finnish EU-debate, but it was rarely 
connected with articles on Norden and has therefore not been included in this material. 
However, the few editorials in my sources that are coded with the security policy-theme 
mentioned that Finland and Sweden would try to remain non-aligned and they would 
not rush defence issues if they joined the EU. The articles in Aftenposten on the other 
hand, were worried that a Norwegian No would mean that the country would be 
marginalised despite its Nato-membership. One editorial article in Aftenposten refers to 
a meeting of the Nordic Ministers of Defence, where an agreement on cooperation on 
security policy issues was signed. The article expressed a worry that a Norwegian No to 
the EU would render the agreement difficult. 
“And the possible Nordic division will in that case coincide with the time when the Nordic 
countries have laid down the general outlines for a cooperation agreement on production, 
acquisition and the utilization of defence materiel. The agreement is an historic event, which 
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suggests that the foreign- and security policy divisions in Norden shall remain as a fairy tale 
only”. 
(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 
1994, page 18.) 
Aftenposten believed that a reorientation of Norden was underway and that Finland had 
taken the helm. The newspaper found it significant that it was the Finnish Minister for 
Defence, Elisabeth Rehn, who gave the conclusion at the Defence Ministers’ meeting. 
“That it would be her, who gave the conclusion, was illustrative both for the Finnish and the 
Nordic reorientation in relation to the European Community”. 
(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 
1994, page 18.) 
The close connection between the political elite in the Nordic countries had a big impact 
on the sense of unity between the countries. Sweden, Norway and Denmark were all led 
by Social Democratic Prime Ministers at the time of the referenda, while Finland was 
lead by Prime Minister Esko Aho of the Centre Party. How close the connections really 
were, is, however, not evident from my sources. Certainly, the editorials mention 
politicians from different Nordic countries offering each other help in the election 
campaigns. But it is also reasonable to assume that the media was not always aware of 
the deliberations held between the Nordic leaders, as the latter did not want the rest of 
the EU-countries to worry too much about a creation of a Nordic bloc within the EU.  
 
In a satiric cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 12, 1994, the day before the 
Swedish referendum, the newspaper highlights the unity among the Nordic political 
elite. In the drawing, which is shown in Figure 3, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson is standing on a traditional Swedish Dalecarlian Horse (Swedish: dalahäst). 
The painted wooden horse is one of the most famous symbols for Sweden, but it is not 
very good at jumping. Therefore, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland is 
standing next to Carlsson yelling “HYPP! HYPP!”, which in English means, “JUMP! 
JUMP!” On the other side of the horse is Norwegian Centre Party leader Anne Enger 
Lahnstein, portrayed as an angry cat. This whole event takes place in an arena, where 
the audience consist of both Yes- and No-supporters to the EU. Three Nordic flags are 
displayed at the arena. The Finnish one is already encircled by the EU-stars, while the 
Swedish and Norwegian flags, in other words the people, soon will have to choose 
 46 
sides. In the arena, the letters “N” and “ORDIC” are written on a wall, which gives the 
impression of the event being the Nordic Championships in EU-membership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, both Carlsson and Brundtland had a tough task to convince their Social 
Democratic voters to vote for EU-membership. In Sweden, Social Democracy and 
neutrality had been closely connected for such a long time, that Carlsson’s U-turn in the 
EU-matter in 1990 was hard to digest for the voters. The Swedish membership 
negotiations advanced during the rightwing coalition government lead by Carl Bildt, but 
Carlsson recaptured the Prime Minister post after the Parliamentary elections in 
September 1994, only two months before the EU referenda. Both Carlsson in Sweden 
and Brundtland in Norway put a lot of own prestige in the EU-matter, but both of them 
guarded themselves as well. Carlsson had appointed two influential No-supporters in his 
Social Democratic government, Minister for Agriculture Margareta Winberg and 
Minister of Public Administration Marita Ulvskog. Brundtland ensured that she would 
stay on the Prime Minister post whatever the outcome of the Norwegian referendum 
would be. In Finland, Prime Minister Esko Aho was criticized for not being clear 
enough with his opinion concerning the EU. In a column, Helsingin Sanomat’s 
Figure 4. Cartoon published in Aftenposten on November 12, 1994, page 6. 
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journalist Erkki Pennanen compared the three Prime Ministers’ approach to the EU-
question. 
“His [Esko Aho’s] position is, that ”the EU-question will be taken care of, if it needs to be 
taken care of”, as he said in an interview in Kaleva on Saturday. Aho does not want to go 
into an open campaign, as for example the President has. (…) The Swedish and Norwegian 
Prime Ministers are campaigning vigorously for what they personally believe in and what 
they see is favourable for their country”. 
(“Carlsson ja Gro uskaltavat panna itsensä likoon”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, 
September 21, 1994, page A2.) 
Some editorial articles overlooked the Nordic interdependence-element and instead 
emphasized the importance of each Nordic country doing what is best for it. In a guest 
column in Helsingin Sanomat, Paul Lillrank wrote that Finland should finally break 
loose from the Swedish mental superiority. Lillrank, who at the time was professor at 
both the Stockholm School of Economics and at the Helsinki University of Technology, 
claimed that Sweden’s state economy and reputation in the world had collapsed and that 
Finland ought to seek itself closer to both Europe and its sister nation Estonia. 
Concerning Nordic cooperation, Lillrank wrote: 
“In this situation, the proposed Nordic cooperation as an alternative to the EU would mean 
that Finland would lash itself together with a sinking ship”. 
(“Ruotsin serkusta Viron veljeksi”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
September 20, 1994, page A2.) 
In contrast to Sweden, Finland had, in Lillrank’s opinion, always been a poor country. 
Following this reasoning, the economic crisis in the early 1990s hit Sweden worse than 
Finland, since Finland was used to manage with less while in Sweden the prosperity had 
continued through generations. Lillrank’s reasoning is interesting. It seems fair to say 
that Sweden had more at stake in the EU-referenda than Finland. The economic crisis in 
the early 1990s led to cutbacks in the welfare system, which the Swedes had been so 
proud of. The Swedish neutrality policy also suddenly lost significance. In other words, 
it was not only Norden’s self-esteem that was challenged, but to a large extent also 
Sweden’s. On top of it all, little brother Finland, who had nothing to lose and everything 
to win, started raising its voice also in Nordic contexts. 
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Despite the fluctuating hierarchy between the Nordic countries, depending on subject 
and time, and despite the somewhat different priorities of Finland, Sweden and Norway, 
the editorials articles showed that the Nordic interdependence was still strong. Even 
though it was possible that Norden was losing some of its significance as a model for 
the rest of Europe, Norden still remained as an important point of reference within the 
Nordic countries. 
 
3.3 Norden still better than the Others 
The reputation, which the Nordic countries had in Europe and in the world during the 
Cold War, was largely due to an admiration of Nordic values, such as a high level of 
welfare, neutrality, equality, solidarity and openness. This reputation had in turn built 
up and maintained the Nordic self-image. When the neutrality was no longer needed 
and the Nordic welfare system was threatened by economic cutbacks in the early 1990s, 
the Nordic self-image was challenged. Ole Wæver wrote, “What appears as 
”progressive” nowadays is the integrating, market-based, cooperative, sovereignty-
neglecting Europe, not the distancing, Third Way, self-protecting, global and inward-
oriented Norden of sovereign states”.67 This statement seems a bit harsh and does not 
find support in my sources. A rearticulation of Norden was, nevertheless, underway and 
the Nordic values and the closely connected Nordic priorities were therefore a natural 
ingredient in the debates in the campaigns prior to the 1994 EU-elections. Contrary to 
theories like the one presented by Wæver above, my research suggests that the Nordic 
values were still viewed as important and even better than European values. As briefly 
discussed in the passage about the Danish experiences in the previous chapter, there was 
a concern in Finland, Sweden and Norway that a EU-membership would force the 
countries to lower their welfare standards to meet the European level. This was an 
important argument among No-supporters, while Yes-supporters tried to reduce such 
worries. For instance, Member of the Finnish Parliament, Maija Perho-Santala of the 
National Coalition Party tried to answer such concerns in a guest column in Helsingin 
Sanomat. Perho-Santala, who was also a member of the Social Affairs and Health 
Committee in the Finnish Parliament, wrote that the EU does not have any jurisdiction 
in social security matters and that a EU-membership, on the contrary, would guarantee 
                                                        
67 Wæver, Ole (1992b): Norden rearticulated. In Øberg, Jan (ed.). Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options 
in the Changing Europe. Pinter Publishers, London, 135. 
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Finland a stable economy to keep the social welfare level high. Moreover, she pointed 
out that there is a demand for the Nordic welfare society model in the EU. 
“Many trade unions and women- and civil rights movements in the EU-countries set a lot of 
hope to Norden’s accession and the example it can give”. 
(“EU ei määrää sosiaaliturvaamme”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 2, 1994, page A2.) 
Journalist Olli Kivinen wrote in a column in Helsingin Sanomat: 
“The defence of the Nordic model is important, because the Nordic countries have succeeded 
to create the best composition for a society so far in history. Finland and Sweden need to 
find a new boost to their economies to preserve the foundation of the welfare state. Norway 
does not have the same concerns thanks to their enormous oil money. (…) The key word for 
the defence of the economy and the welfare model is supervision of national interests. To be 
able to secure our interests, we have to get to the table where the decisions are made”. 
(“Suomen valinta”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 13, 1994, page A2.) 
In an attempt to flatter the Finnish voters, Gabriel Fragniere, the principal of the 
prestigious College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium wrote: 
“We need the Nordic traditions that Finland carefully nurtures, to eliminate the union’s 
criticised democratic deficit and to promote the openness of the decision process”. 
(“EU-Suomesta Itämeri-alueen keskus”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 8, 1994, page A2.) 
Thus, the understanding that there existed typical Nordic values still prevailed, despite 
the alleged crisis in the Nordic identity. This was noticed both among the Nordics 
themselves, as well as among other Europeans. The conflict-frame was visible when 
Nordic values were put against Southern European values. Since the newspapers in my 
analysis were pro-EU, they saw EU-membership as a necessity to maintain a stable 
economy, which was needed to finance the welfare state. But another reason of joining 
the EU was to spread the Nordic values to other countries or try to change the EU from 
the inside. In the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, the Nordic values and priorities 
were intrinsically connected with responsibility. Norden, or more precisely Sweden, 
should bring its values to the rest of Europe in order to make the EU a better and more 
Swedish place. Anna Christensen, professor of civil law wrote in a guest column in DN: 
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“It is not the Swedes, who have created the EU, and maybe we would have wanted the 
political organisation in Europe to be differently shaped. But we cannot create an alternative 
EU according to the Swedish or Nordic model. The EU is already there. (…) Our 
possibilities to exercise some kind of political influence on a European level presuppose us 
joining the political organisation that exists and trying to influence it from the inside”. 
(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column published in Dagens Nyheter on 
November 11, 1994, page A2.) 
Dagens Nyheter used the responsibility-frame more frequently than the Finnish and 
Norwegian newspapers. The editorial articles in DN repeatedly talked about the 
responsibility Sweden had towards the rest of Europe. They meant that if Sweden says 
No to the EU, many countries will be disappointed, not least the Baltic countries who 
saw the Nordic accessions as a step closer to the EU for them as well. According to the 
Swedish editorials, a Finnish No would be understandable because of the agriculture 
and a Norwegian No would be understandable because of the oil and the Nato-
membership, but a Swedish No would only be an expression of Swedish 
introspectiveness and nostalgia. If the Nordics said No, it would also mean more power 
to the Southern European countries: 
“If the countries in the North abdicate from such a responsibility it means in practice that we 
give away the equivalent amount of influence to other countries. (…) Somewhat brutally, 
one can say that the entry of the EFTA-countries in the EU is expected to reduce the 
influence Southern European, Latin and protectionist countries have on the European future, 
and therefore contribute to the development of Europe in a direction that is more in line with 
the interests and values in Northern Europe”. 
(“Vårt ansvar för Europa”, press cutting from Ekonomisk debatt published in Dagens 
Nyheter on October 16, 1994, page A2.) 
This kind of rhetoric clearly indicates a difference between Norden and others, in this 
case, Southern European countries. It also suggests that the Nordic interests and values 
are better than others. It is not surprising, that the passage above comes from a Swedish 
newspaper. At least when it comes to values, the feeling in the Swedish debate seemed 
more focused on what Sweden could do for Europe than what Europe could do for 
Sweden. The same thing applies to the Norwegian debate, but to a much lesser extent, 
while editorials in the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat talked more about what a 
EU-membership would signify for Finland. In this case, the countries’ different 
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histories were clearly visible in the debate. Sweden, with a history of being a great 
power in Europe and later associated with the famous Swedish middle way, modernity 
and prosperity had a strong belief itself. Norway had for a long time been a poor 
country under both Danish and Swedish rule, but a strong nationalism and an 
economically stable situation due to the money generated by the oil industry boosted the 
Norwegian self-esteem. Finland did not gain its independence from Russia until 1917 
and after that followed a civil war and later two wars against the Soviet Union. The 
Fenno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance also 
limited the Finnish abilities to take action from 1948 until 1991, when the Soviet Union 
was dissolved and Finland gave notice of the agreement. Naturally, the Finns had had a 
shorter period of time to develop and nourish their self-esteem, but this was helped up 
by an eager wish to become a part of Western Europe. In the Swedish case, the belief in 
the own country sometimes took absurd proportions. One editorial article referred to 
this as the superiority complex. The point was that the Swedes’ perception of their 
standard of living made them look down on others. In fact, the economic crisis had 
already lowered the Swedish level of welfare, but the old perception of Sweden still 
prevailed among the Swedes. One editorial article in DN struck me, although it is not 
included in the material since it did not cover Norden in any way. It was an article 
relating to the domestic debate in Sweden about different arguments on the Yes- and 
No-side. DN, which was a pronounced Yes-newspaper, criticized how the No-side in 
Sweden seemed to have a strong ideal picture of Sweden as the country with the best 
welfare, the best food, the best environment and openness, among other things. DN did 
not seem to be aware that the Yes-side also idealised Sweden, certainly not as obvious 
as the No-side, but still much more than Finland or Norway did. For instance, in an 
editorial article about the new European Commission and its President Jacques Santer, 
DN wrote: 
“The President sounds sympathetic when he remarkably “Swedish” talks for openness, 
equality, friendliness towards the environment and institutions closer to the people”. 
(“En vänlig knuff från Santer”, long editorial article published in Dagens Nyheter on 
October 31, 1994, page A2.) 
Thus, Dagens Nyheter often referred to values such as openness, equality and 
democracy as typical Swedish values, while in Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten the 
same values were referred to as Nordic values. This is also the case with the Swedish 
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versus the Nordic model. DN talks more about the Swedish model, while HS and AP 
talk about the Nordic model. It is true that the Swedish model was a concept, but it 
eventually developed into the Nordic model when the other Nordic countries started 
building up their societies in a similar way. Hans Mouritzen claims, “‘Swedish’ and 
‘Nordic’ have often been confused, making the other Nordic countries free riders on the 
model”.68 The two concepts are now more or less used parallelly. 
 
The Nordic welfare model naturally received a lot of attention, but the Nordic concerns 
for transparency in public administration, gender equality and the environment were 
also noticed. Environment was mentioned in several editorials, but there were very few 
articles where the environment was the most dominant theme. The number of articles 
coded with the environment as the main theme was therefore not high, but the debate 
about the environment was, nevertheless, visible in all three countries. Most editorials 
agreed that the environmental problems were so large that they needed to be addressed 
internationally. The environmental priorities between the different Nordic countries, 
however, differed somewhat, as the following passage from Aftenposten shows: 
“If Norway, Sweden and Finland become members, then the Kola peninsula will become a 
neighbourhood of the EU. An own cleanup-program and an own Kola-foundation. Sweden 
and Finland are, however, more interested in the EU engaging in the Baltic Sea, in the Baltic 
countries and in the Saint Petersburg-area. The EU:s engagement in the Kola peninsula will 
therefore largely depend on Norway’s future connection to the union”. 
(“Blir atom-trusselen EUs ansvar?”, commentary published in Aftenposten on October 18, 
1994, page 14.) 
The No-supporters in Finland, Sweden and Norway pretty much used the same 
arguments as the Yes-supporters when it came to values, but they interpreted them 
differently. No-supporters believed that the Nordic values would be best defended 
outside of the EU. Mikko Vesa, the president of the Young people’s EU-Forum 
(Nuorten EU-foorum), wrote in a guest column in HS: 
“In Norden, democracy goes together with openness in the public decision-making process. 
The European Union is not a democratic organisation, and it does not respect the principle of 
transparency. (…) Why then, would not the Nordic countries join the union and change it? In 
my opinion, we have to be realistic; our influence would be very little and secondly, if the                                                         
68 Mouritzen, Hans (1995): The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall. In 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No.1, 12. 
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union would have a need to change according to our model, this would have happened 
already in connection with the Maastricht process. 
(“Parempi Eurooppa ihmisten ehdoilla”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 1, 1994, page A2.)  
The responsibility-frame was also frequently used by No-supporters, but in a totally 
different way than the Yes-side used it. While the Yes-side talked about a responsibility 
to bring Nordic values to the rest of Europe, the No-side argued that Norden should take 
responsibility for the Third World by staying outside of the EU. Thomas Wallgren, 
research assistant at the Academy of Finland and president of the Yes to the World – No 
thank you to the EU Forum (Kyllä maailmalle – kiitos ei EU:lle-foorum), wrote in a 
guest column in HS: 
“Outside of the EU, Finland maintains the possibility to hold on to the pretension to respect 
all people equally and cherish a world wide solidarity”. 
(“EU edustaa länttä varsin heikosti”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
September 25, 1994, page A2.) 
Similarly, in one of the few EU-critical texts published in Aftenposten during the last 
month before the EU-referenda, Aina Edelmann, chairwoman of Norwegian Farmers 
and Smallholders Union (Norges Bonde- og Småbrukarlag), wrote: 
“The question, which is raised, is therefore if we in Norway see the opportunity and the 
challenge that lies in standing outside the strong bloc creation precisely to be able to 
continue the important role as a bridge-builder – both to the East and to the South”. 
(“Norge og EU-blokken”, guest column published in Aftenposten on November 18, 1994, 
page 14.) 
The concern for the Third World had according to Ole Wæver traditionally been one of 
the main components of the Nordic identity, together with being a low-tension area in 
security policy terms and offering a model for the welfare society. Whereas the end of 
the Cold War made most of Europe into a low-tension area and welfare systems started 
to become quite well spread all over Europe, Wæver saw the concern of the Third 
World as something that could possible save some Nordism in the process of 
Europeanization.69 In my material, the concern for the Third World did not receive a lot 
of attention, and when it did, it was in two EU-critical guest columns. This does of                                                         
69 Wæver 1992a, 84-87. 
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course not mean that the Yes-side lacked a concern for the Third World, but my sources 
indicates that it was not one of the most important features ascribed to Norden and 
therefore my material tell against Wæver’s theory on this point. 
 
Religion was not a very common theme either. Lutheranism is the main faith in all three 
countries, all though the societies are largely secularised. In Norway, the church leaders 
were openly against EU-membership while their colleagues in Sweden and Finland 
were pro-EU. This difference led to a couple of articles in Aftenposten, which pointed 
to the historically close connection between Christianity and the shaping of Europe. The 
newspaper thought it was strange that the churches in Norway were against a 
cooperating Europe, while churches in other European countries work for solidarity 
between the countries. In the Finnish and Swedish newspapers, religion received even 
less attention. A parallel to the Nordic work ethic was, however, drawn in Helsingin 
Sanomat. Although the Nordic countries are largely secularised, the Lutheran heritage 
lives on in the protestant work ethic. In a column, journalist Erkki Pennanen tries to 
reduce the No-side’s frightening arguments about the bureaucracy in Brussels by 
instead calling Finland the Promised Land of directives. According to him, Euro 
directives are best followed in Denmark of all the EU-countries, but in his mind, 
Finland and Sweden are probably even more conscious bearers of the Nordic work ethic 
and law-abidingness. He fears that the Finnish bureaucracy will take the Euro directives 
much more seriously than elsewhere. 
“In the countries at the Mediterranean the mentality is completely different. According to 
some claims, there has been no time or interest to translate parts of the directives, to for 
example Greek. Over there the directives are thus not known, and of course not followed 
(…) this does not mean that our bureaucracy should compromise the high Nordic work ethic 
and law-abidingness. But when we join such a big international community as the EU we 
need to learn to function according to the same rules as the others. That also applies to the 
status of directives and the following of them”. 
(“Suomi on direktiivien luvattu maa”, column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 
12, 1994, page A2.) 
It seems as if Pennanen appreciated Nordic values, but in the same time thought that 
Finland should adapt to the rules in the EU. Once again, this is an indication of the 
Finnish eagerness to join the EU and secondly, that the Finnish self-esteem was less 
developed than the Swedish and Norwegian ones. While the feeling in most of the 
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editorial articles in Dagens Nyheter was that the EU should adapt to Swedish and 
Nordic rules, the feeling in Helsingin Sanomat was more submissive. Certainly, the 
Finnish editorials also expressed pride over Nordic values, but they were also coloured 
by realist politics. In Norway, Nordic values received surprisingly little attention. It 
seems reasonable that the country’s oil money made Norway less dependent of the EU 
to maintain a stable economy, which in turn was needed to finance the welfare system. 
The welfare system was not as threatened in Norway as it was in Finland and Sweden 
and therefore it needed not to be defended as much either. The main fear in Norway was 
connected with being isolated and marginalised. In Norway, the Nordic unity was more 
important than the Nordic values. The tone in Aftenposten was more defensive than in 
Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter. A large share of the editorial articles used their 
space in the newspaper to answer to the critique from the No-side and to try to show the 
inaccuracies in the No-supporters’ rhetoric. This can be explained by the larger share of 
No-supporters in Norway than in the other two countries. Editorial articles critical to the 
EU were also more rare in Aftenposten than in the two other newspapers. While the 
editorials in Aftenposten generally had a defensive character, the editorials in Dagens 
Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat concentrated more on the future.  
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4 A Changing Nordic identity? 
The Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian responses to the changes in Europe at the shift of 
the decade were ultimately the EU-referenda in the autumn of 1994. The previous 
reluctance or incapacity to join the European integration project was not as prominent as 
before in these three countries. They had become increasingly dependent on the EU and 
they wanted to join the decision-making processes within the union. In the 1990s, it was 
popular among researchers to claim that the end of the Cold War had made Norden and 
the Nordic values lose some of its significance in the world and that Norden therefore 
had fallen into an identity crisis. So did for example Ole Wæver. As my findings in the 
previous chapter indicate, the belief in Norden was still strong in the editorial articles 
written the last month before the referenda. My findings therefore make me question 
how serious this Nordic identity crisis really was. To be able to answer that we have to 
take a closer look at what one can mean with Nordic identity. 
 
The concept Nordic identity indicates sameness between the five Nordic countries 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Pertti Joenniemi describes Norden as 
a common value system, which originates from the middle of the 19th century.70 
According to him, Norden constituted an alternative during the build-up-period of the 
nation-states. In this process, the nation-states won, but instead of disappearing, Norden 
remained as a sphere by the side of the nation-states.71 In the book The Cultural 
Construction of Norden, the editors Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen ask themselves 
what Norden really is. Their answer is that, apart from being a geographical area, 
Norden also exists as a construction based on history and that the bricks in this 
construction are the nation-states.72 To them, a Nordic identity is not a threat against the 
national identities, but rather something that can reinforce the national identities in the 
North. According to Uffe Østergård, Norden is perceived as “non-European, non-
Catholic, anti-Rome, anti-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, 
and social democratic”73. He points out that there are no “objective laws binding the                                                         
70 Joenniemi 1994a, 23-24. 
71 Joenniemi 1994a, 24. 
72 Stråth, Bo – Sørensen, Øystein (ed.) (1997): The Cultural Construction of Norden. Scandinavian 
University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo, 19.  
73 Østergård, Uffe (1997): The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-states. 
In Stråth, Bo and Sørensen, Øystein (ed.). The Cultural Construction of Norden. Scandinavian University 
Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo, 25. 
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people of the North together in a common destiny”74 but instead, he sees Nordic identity 
as a mental construct, built on historical and cultural components. Concerning the 
Nordic identity versus the national ones, Østergård is on the same line as Stråth and 
Sørensen. To him, a trans-state Nordic identity coexists with the national identities75. 
The relationship between the Nordic identity and the individual national identities in 
Norden thus seems to be a peaceful one. These different identities rather strengthen than 
threaten each other. The Nordic identity is perceived as an additional level besides the 
national ones, not an alternative to them. 
 
4.1 Nordic identity in a crisis? 
As already mentioned in the definition of the concept of identity, identities are 
constructed through differences. Following this logic, the Nordic identity is built on 
what differentiates it from others. If this other is Europe or the European Union, then a 
possible conclusion could be that rapprochement towards the EU reduces the 
differences and therefore threatens the Nordic identity. This was a popular suggestion 
made by scholars in the first half of the 1990s. Håkan Wiberg and Ole Wæver argue that 
“the very existence of the Cold War was among the preconditions for upholding this 
self-image because it was defined (partly) by contrast”.76 When the contrast between 
Norden and the rest of Europe was not as clear as before, this, according to them, shook 
Norden’s perception of itself. Pertti Joenniemi believed that there was no longer room 
for a Nordic alternative between an increased emphasis on the national objectives on the 
one hand, and the euro enthusiasm on the other.77 More recent studies, like Hans E. 
Andersson’s article What activates an identity? The case of Norden agrees with Wiberg 
and Wæver that the Nordic identity was put under severe stress in the beginning of the 
1990s, but in the same time Andersson questions whether this actually was a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War and the increased significance of the EU. In his 
article, he suggests that it was rather the different economic interests in the Nordic 
countries that led to a weakened commitment to Nordic identity.78 In his 2009 article,                                                         
74 Østergård, 70. 
75 Østergård, 71. 
76 Wiberg, Håkan and Wæver, Ole (1992): Norden in the Cold War Reality. In Øberg, Jan (ed.). Nordic 
Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe. Pinter Publishers, London, 28. 
77 Joenniemi, Pertti (1994b): Kampen om Norden; EU-bihang eller neo-region? In Bingen, Jon – Lindahl, 
Rutger (ed.) Nordiske skjebnevalg? Europa-programmet, Oslo, 77. 
78 Andersson, E. Hans (2010): What activates an Identity? The Case of Norden. In International 
Relations, 24 (46), 61. 
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Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 
Kazimierz Musiał also joins the above-mentioned scholars. To him, the new situation in 
the early 1990s threatened Norden’s significance both internationally and among the 
home public. He feared that Norden would become irrelevant on the international scene 
and he questioned “whether the Nordic framework constituted an attractive and unifying 
construction for the citizens in the Nordic countries to identify with”.79 
 
In my mind, the perception that Norden all of a sudden lost significance in the early 
1990s is exaggerated, as well as the notion that Nordic identity was in a crisis. 
Certainly, the great changes in Europe also had implications on Norden and the Nordic 
reality, but as my research shows, Norden never lost value; it was only overlooked 
when the EU entered the debate in Norden. The key problem with assertions such as the 
ones provided by the above-mentioned scholars is that they seem to put Norden and 
Nordic identity against Europe and a possible European identity. Their logic seems to 
be that if the EU becomes more popular in Norden, then Norden’s popularity 
automatically has to decline. In my newspaper sources, the EU was never presented as 
an alternative to Norden. None of the writers behind the editorial articles suggested that 
the Nordic cooperation and the Nordic identity would have to leave room for the 
European equivalent. On the contrary, most of them believed that it was possible to 
combine being both Nordic and European, and they actually saw the EU as a way of 
renewing the Nordic cooperation. Even though Pertti Joenniemi has indicated that there 
was a crisis in the Nordic identity in the early 1990s, he also argued that Europe was not 
a threat against the Nordic identity. 
“Europeanization does not demand a redefinition and an abandoning of our own identity, the 
Nordic “we”, but instead a strategy for Europe can be founded on the sense of solidarity and 
a common value-system that already exists. (…) A meeting between Norden and Europe – a 
hypothetical one – does not lead to a fight where one of them is fighting against the other 
about a scarce and public political space. The meeting resembles more a gathering – and 
maybe even a reunion – if the memory of the history of ideas works the way it should”.80 
(My translation) 
                                                        
79 Musiał, Kazimierz (2009): Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe on the Threshold of the 21st 
Century. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 34, No.3, 288. 
80 Joenniemi 1994a, 43. 
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Joenniemi thus lifts up the similarities between Norden and Europe instead of the 
differences, and he indicates that it is possible to feel both Nordic and European at the 
same time. This is also cleverly illustrated in one of the cartoons in my newspaper 
sources. The cartoon in Figure 5 below was published in Helsingin Sanomat on the day 
of the Finnish referendum. The cartoon contains eight boxes. The boxes show pictures 
of Space (Avaruus), the Galaxy (Linnunrata), the Solar System (Aurinkokunta), Earth 
(Maapallo), Europe (Eurooppa), Norden (Pohjola) and Finland (Suomi). In the last box, 
a Finnish voter is standing and looking at all these places that he belongs to. In a speech 
bubble he says: Why not? (Miksi ei?). The cartoon is a very good example of how the 
national, regional and international levels are not put against each other, but rather build 
a chain of identity, in this case all the way up to Space. The voter on the picture is a part 
of all these communities. He might feel closer to some of them than others, but they 
cannot replace each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The commitment to Norden varies 
The understanding that we have multiple identities has also been highlighted by Hans E. 
Andersson. According to him, also a state can have many identities and what activates 
one of them and not the other is dependent on situational relevance and commitment. 
Andersson writes, ”While the former refers to the situation ‘fitting’ the specific 
characteristics of an identity, the latter implies that not all identities are equally 
Figure 5. Cartoon published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 16, 1994, page A2. 
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important.”81 In the case of Norden, Andersson suggests that the Nordic identity is more 
visible in certain areas of cooperation and less in others. For example, when the Nordic 
Passport Union was challenged by the Schengen agreement, the Nordic identity was 
intensively activated because the Nordic countries were very committed to free 
movement in Norden. On the other hand, the Nordic identity in international 
environmental negotiations was less active in the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s. 
We often talk about Nordic identity in singular, when in fact the degree of commitment 
to Norden by the Nordic countries differs from subject to subject. My study found that 
the element of Nordicness was stronger in areas like values and when Norden was used 
as a point of reference, while for example Nordic religion was not a frequent theme. 
Apart from subjects, the degree of commitment to Norden also varies between the 
different countries and different times. My research indicates, among other things, that 
the Finnish editorial articles attached great importance to the renewal and strengthening 
of Nordic cooperation, the Swedish editorials talked a lot about Norden as a natural 
point of reference and the responsibility Norden had to the rest of the world and the 
Norwegian editorials stressed the Nordic unity and a fear of being isolated from its 
neighbours. The newspaper editorials rarely referred to Nordic identity explicitly, but 
through the thematic use of Norden in the editorials as well as the attitudes 
demonstrated towards Norden, one could conclude that Norden was viewed as 
something positive and uniting. 
 
In the book European Integration and National Identities. The Challenge of the Nordic 
States, edited by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, several researchers reflect on the 
European integration in Norden from a national perspective. The focus in the book is on 
the national identities in Norden, but there are also mentions of Norden as an entity and 
of a Nordic identity. In the book, which was published in 2002, the alleged crisis of the 
Nordic identity in the early 1990s is no longer highlighted, but instead Nordic 
superiority and Norden’s difference from Europe once again enters the debate. Or as 
Lene Hansen writes in the conclusion, “‘Norden’ is juxtaposed to ‘the EU’, with the 
former being a natural, organic community amongst equally democratic, 
environmentalist, pro-women’s rights, etc. nations – the EU by contrast is the opposite 
of all these (good) things. ‘Norden’ is in short used as a significant marker to identify                                                         
81 Andersson, 48. 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‘us’ against ‘Europe’“.82 This is the same rhetoric which was used to describe Norden 
before the EU entered the Nordic picture in the early 1990s, and which according to my 
newspaper sources never stopped being used, at least not during the campaigns prior to 
the three EU-referenda in the autumn of 1994. The late 1980s and early 1990s 
constituted an important transition period in both Europe and Norden. The 
unpredictability that the changes brought with them naturally gave rise to reflections on 
the future of Norden. As demonstrated, a common view was that the end of the Cold 
War and the decline in the Nordic welfare system would result in a crisis in the Nordic 
identity. These assertions had more a character of theoretical assumptions than 
empirically grounded studies. As my research suggests, and as we can conclude with the 
knowledge we have today, almost 20 years later, the Nordic identity was not run over 
by the EU. Certainly, Norden had to adapt to the new challenges that the EU posed and 
it was surely neglected sometimes, but Norden still enjoyed the public esteem. In the 
EU-referenda campaigns in Finland, Sweden and Norway, Norden was used as an 
argument by both the Yes-side and the No-side. The EU-opponents wanted to maintain 
or strengthen the old Norden outside of the union, while the EU-supporters wanted to 
renew and strengthen Norden inside the EU. 
                                                        
82 Hansen, Lene (2002): Conclusion. In Hansen, Lene – Wæver, Ole (ed.) European Integration and 
National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States. Routledge, London, New York, 224. 
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5 Conclusions 
The time around the 1994 EU-referenda was an exciting transition period. The old 
Europe, which had been divided into two, but nevertheless stood for something stable 
and predictable, was changing into something unknown. So also happened with Norden. 
The uncertainty forced Norden to choose paths. Was a future Norden going to be a part 
of Europe or against Europe? Was it possible to combine being both Nordic and 
European? These questions gave rise to several books and reports on the future of 
Norden in the early 1990s. Many of them believed that Norden was part of the past and 
that the Nordic countries would have to join the EU as not to be forgotten in the 
peripheral North. My research shows the contrary, that Norden never lost value but only 
became a little less fashionable. Both internally in Norden and outside of the region, the 
Nordic values were still admired. Transparency, the welfare system and gender equality 
were still viewed as typical Nordic values. The EU-supporters believed that these values 
could be best defended inside the EU since the maintaining of, for example, the welfare 
system needed stable economies. The EU-opponents on the other hand believed that the 
preservation of Nordic values required the Nordic countries to stay outside of the bloc 
creation that they believed the EU constituted. In the debates prior to the three Nordic 
EU-referenda it also became clear that the Nordic countries did not intend to play a 
passive role inside the European Union, but rather they were planning for a 
“Nordification” of Europe from the inside of the union. Whether this has actually 
happened since Finland and Sweden joined the EU is questionable, but at least the 
intent was to bring Nordic values to the EU. The results of this study also indicate that 
the Nordic countries still turned to each other for advice and comparison; Norden was 
still the natural point of reference, not Europe. Moreover, even though the 
institutionalised Nordic cooperation had seen better days, nobody wanted to end the 
cooperation but rather renew it and strengthen it. It was natural that the EU received a 
lot of attention in the Nordic media prior to the referenda, since the voters needed to be 
informed about what the options in the referenda were. In my opinion though, the 
Nordic presence in the media the last month before the three referenda was surprisingly 
high. It was evident that Norden and Europe were closely intertwined. Or as Lene 
Hansen puts it: “Even those who argue for ‘Norden’ as an alternative to the EU present 
this option in opposition to Europe, not in isolation from the European question.”83                                                         
83 Hansen, 13. 
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It was, however, clear that Norden would have to change to cope with the new situation. 
Even if Norden remained a strong brand, it unavoidably ended up in the shadow of the 
EU. Lene Hansen says that it was Europe that conditioned Norden and not the other 
way around.84 The Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat distinguished itself by 
publishing a lot of editorials on the future Nordic cooperation. It viewed the current 
Nordic cooperation nostalgic and it heavily opposed the idea of creating a stronger 
Nordic union as an alternative to the EU. Instead, the editorials hoped that the EU-
accessions would offer a renaissance and an additional arena for the Nordic cooperation. 
Finland actually continued on the same line as Helsingin Sanomat after the accession in 
the EU. In 1997, Finland took the initiative to establish the Northern Dimension, a 
policy framework for the Northern countries of the European Union and the 
neighbouring non-union countries. The Northern Dimension is today a framework 
shared by the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia. Other partners are different regional 
councils and financial institutions. 
 
Dagens Nyheter distinguished itself by discussing the responsibility Sweden and 
Norden had to the rest of Europe. Many articles regretted that Norden had not been able 
to create a stronger political organisation, but the solution was to make the best out of 
the EU by introducing Swedish values in the union. Dagens Nyheter often referred to 
the Swedish values, while Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten refererred to the same 
values as Nordic ones. The Swedish editorials viewed Sweden as the core of Norden 
and they were both impressed and worried of Sweden’s own position when little brother 
Finland voted Yes to EU and showed the way for the rest of Norden. The editorial 
articles in Helsingin Sanomat also expressed pride over the Nordic values, but in the 
same time they were more submissive than the articles in Dagens Nyheter. HS stressed 
more what the EU could do for Finland than what Finland could do for the EU. My 
suggestion to why this was so, is that the Finns were so eager to finally join the Western 
Europe and the EU that they were more willing to adapt to EU standards and working 
methods. Also, the Finnish self-esteem was lower than the Swedish and Norwegian 
ones, or perhaps more coloured by realist politics.  
 
                                                        
84 Hansen, 13 
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The editorial articles in Aftenposten were of a more defensive character. The No-
supporters were in majority in Norway, and the newspaper took the role of defending 
the EU and shooting down the No-side’s arguments. In Norway, the economic situation 
was better than in Finland and Sweden thanks to the country’s oil revenues. The future 
financing of the welfare system was therefore not discussed as much as in the two other 
countries. Instead, Aftenposten stressed the Nordic unity and how isolated Norway 
would be if the country did not follow its Nordic neighbours. Especially after Finland 
and Sweden had voted Yes to EU, the newspaper lifted up the fear of being left alone. 
 
All three newspapers in my research were positive towards the European Union. This 
has of course influenced my study heavily and the study is mainly to be seen as an 
example of how Norden was presented by the Yes-side. Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens 
Nyheter did to a larger extent than Aftenposten also give voice to EU-opponents, but 
this cannot in any way be compared with the attention the EU-supporters received. As 
the major, or one of the major, newspapers in their respective countries, however, 
Helsingin Sanomat, Dagens Nyheter and Aftenposten had a significant role as creators 
of public opinion. Whether the opinions expressed in the editorial pages of these 
newspapers actually played a role in the outcome of the three EU-referenda, is not 
possible to say from the results of this study. The results do, however, offer empirically 
grounded descriptions and analyses of how these newspapers viewed Norden in the EU-
referenda context. Contrary to the scholars, who in the beginning of the 1990s, 
suggested that Norden had lost significance and that the Nordic identity was in a crisis, 
this study shows that this belief was not shared by the journalists, guest columnists, 
politicians, authors and activists who got their voices heard in the newspapers of my 
study. The Nordic identity was not explicitly visible in the newspaper sources, but 
rather it permeated the whole debate on Norden. There exists a sense of togetherness 
between the Nordic countries, which is not seen between just any countries. The identity 
has historical and cultural elements and is manifested through a concern for the other 
Nordic countries, a strong interdependence, and certain Nordic values, which are 
believed better than others. This study suggests that the Nordic identity was not in a 
crisis but only a bit overshadowed by the EU.  
 
Since the aim of this study has been to qualitatively describe and analyse how Norden 
was presented in the chosen newspapers, the quantitative tables in Chapter 2 do not 
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really do my material justice. Many articles consisted of several themes and several 
frames and it was difficult to code each article according to only one theme and one 
frame. Nevertheless, the tables are, in my opinion, valuable since they give a general 
and an easily apprehensible overview of the most dominant themes and frames in the 
different newspapers. The decision to only include the editorial pages in this study is 
motivated in two ways. Firstly, the aim of the study was to analyse Norden as an 
argument in the three newspapers and the editorial page is the place where opinions and 
recommendations are most evidently manifested. Secondly, out of practical reasons I 
viewed it more important to analyse editorial pages from a longer time-span than to 
include all parts of the newspapers but instead limit the period of time. 
 
In hindsight, we can see that the European integration did not hinder a continuing 
Nordic cooperation. The cooperation has continued through the official Nordic 
institutions, but also through grassroots associations and a close connection between 
Nordic politicians. At the time of the writing of this thesis, a new born interest for 
Norden is seen in the Nordic countries. This interest was especially manifested after the 
publication of the book Förbundsstaten Norden (United Nordic Federation) by Swedish 
historian Gunnar Wetterberg, in the autumn of 2010.85 In an opinion poll among people 
in the Nordic countries, done in connection to the book release, 42% of the respondents 
were positive or very positive towards a Nordic federation.86 Another recent important 
Nordic publication is the so-called Stoltenberg report, named after the former 
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg. In the report, 
Stoltenberg gives 13 suggestions on how the Nordic cooperation on foreign- and 
security policy issues could be strengthened.87 The popularity of Norden thus seems to 
fluctuate in time and it is interesting to compare today’s situation with the one at the 
time of the Nordic EU-referenda. In the early 1990s, when Europe and the EU rose in 
popularity in Norden this did not mean that Norden’s popularity fell drastically. 
Similarly, today’s increased interest in Norden does not necessarily mean a decrease in 
Europe’s popularity. This was, for example, shown in a recent study measuring the 
Finns’ attitudes towards the European Union. The study, which was conducted by the                                                         
85 Wetterberg, Gunnar (2010): Förbundsstaten NORDEN. TemaNord 2010:582. Nordiska ministerrådet, 
Köpenhamn. 
86 Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers (2012b): Surprisingly strong support for United 
Nordic Federation, website. 
87 Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2009): Nordisk Samarbeid om Utenriks- og Sikkerhetspolitikk, website. 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Finnish policy and pro-market think tank EVA, Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta,88 shows 
that 55% of the asked Finns were favourably disposed towards the Finnish EU-
membership. This is the highest number of support of the Finnish EU-membership since 
the country joined the European Union. My study therefore suggests that Norden and 
Europe are not mutually exclusive; there is room enough for both Nordic and European 
cooperation. It is possible to feel both Nordic and European in the same time. 
 
 
 
                                                        
88 Haavisto, Ilkka (2012): EU VAI EI? EVAn arvo- ja asennetutkimus 2012. Taloustieto Oy, Helsinki. 
Webiste. 
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Appendix 1 – Code schedule  
 
 
Source:   1 HS 
  2 DN 
  3 AP 
 
Date:  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Type of editorial:   1 Long editorial article 
  2 Short editorial article 
  3 Column/Commentary 
  4 Guest column 
  5 Photograph 
  6 Cartoon 
  7 Press cutting from another newspaper 
 
Author:  1 Newspaper’s own staff, who if mentioned: 
  2 Guest author, who: 
  3 Signature, who: 
  4 Other newspaper, which one: 
5 Photographer, who: 
6 Cartoonist, who: 
 
Description:  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In Vivo:  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Analysis:  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Theme:  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
Frame:  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 2 – The Citations in Original Languages 
 
 
“[j]ossa maalaillaan kaikilla sateenkaaren väreillä harhaa uudesta uljaasta 
pohjoismaisesta yhteistyöstä”. 
(“Ruotsin vaalitulos”, press cutting from Kouvolan Sanomat, published in Helsingin 
Sanomat on September 21, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Pohjoismailla on paljon enemmän yhteistä keskenään kuin EU-maiden kanssa. 
Pohjoismaisen yhteistyön suuret konkreettiset saavutukset ovat kuitenkin olleet vähäisiä 
sitten passivapauden ja vapaiden työmarkkinoiden luomisen. (…) Euroopan yhteisö ajoi 
pohjoismaiden ohitse. Pohjoismaiden kiinnostus siirtyi yhteistyön kehittämiseen 
laajemmilla eurooppalaisilla foorumeilla. Paluu takaisin pohjoismaiseen yhteistyöhön 
olisi taka-askel, joka tuskin innostaisi ketään”. 
(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”?”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat September 
27, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Visst kan man beklaga att de nordiska länderna inte lyckades skapa en starkare 
gemensam politisk organisation. Men det tåget har redan gått. Danmark är medlem av 
EU sedan många år och Finland har redan röstat ja. Om vi i framtiden skall kunna driva 
en gemensam nordisk politik måste det ske inom den vidare politiska ram som EU 
utgör”. 
(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter November 
11, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Nå er det opp til det norske folk å bestemme om også vi skal delta i utdypningen av det 
nordiske samarbeide innenfor den bredere europeiske ramme. Og det er opp til oss å 
avgjøre om et samlet Norden skal gjøre seg gjeldende ved utformningen av fremtidens 
Europa”. 
(“Overbevisende ja-flertall”, long editorial article, published in Aftenposten November 14, 
1994, page 14.) 
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“I femti år har først krigen, og så øst-vest-spenningen, splittet Norden. Nå legger ikke 
lenger geopolitikken, men muligens vi selv, hindringer i veien for nordisk samarbeide 
om utenrikspolitikk og forsvar”. 
(“Splittet Norden på EU-tog i fart?”, commentary, published in Aftenposten November, 17, 
1994, page 16.) 
 
“En av poängerna med parallella medlemskapsförhandlingar var ju att forma ett starkt 
nordiskt block med stora möjligheter att påverka EU:s utveckling. (…) Drömmen om 
ett intensifierat nordiskt samarbete inom unionens ram stannar vid en dröm med Norge 
utanför”. 
(“Landet Annorlunda utanför”, long editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter 
November 30, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Kun meillä pelotellaan itsenäisyyden ja omaleimaisuuden menettämisellä, 
muukalaistulvalla ja sosiaaliturvan romahduksella, kannattaa katsoa Tanskaan. EU ei 
ole murentanut tanskalaista hyvinvointimallia eikä tuonut maahan laumoittain 
vapaamatkustajia nauttimaan korkeasta sosiaaliturvasta tai kahmimaan itselleen maat ja 
mannut”. 
(“Tanskan uusi taudinmääritys”, press cutting from Aamulehti, published in Helsingin 
Sanomat September 24, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“[m]åste även nejsidan konstatera att Danmark, trots ett mångårigt medlemskap, 
fortfarande är en demokrati där folketinget har betydelse, och ett land där man kan 
avnjuta smörrebröd, röda korvar och öl”. 
(“Debatt om EU gynnar jasidan”, short editorial article, published in Dagens Nyheter 
October 21, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Kun Ruotsi jätti EU-hakemuksensa, se ei kertonut siitä etukäteen Suomelle tai 
Norjalle. Se halusi varmistaa itselleen parhaan paikan jonossa. Yhtä lailla virallinen 
Suomi on valmis kulkemaan omaa tietään, vaikka Ruotsi ja Norja joutuisivat jäämään 
ulkopuolelle”. 
(“Mikä ihmeen “Pohjolan yhteisö”? “, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, September 
27, 1994, page A2.) 
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“För svenskt näringsliv blir det ännu mer påtagligt att utanförskap är konstigt. Finländsk 
skogsindustri, hårdaste konkurrent till den svenska skogsindustrin, skulle slippa 
tidsfördröjande gränskontroller vid transporter till kontinenten, medan den svenska 
skulle ha problemet kvar. Den skulle till skillnad från den svenska få inflytande över 
EU:s regelverk för skogsindustrin.” 
(“Nytt läge inför svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial, published in Dagens Nyheter 
October 18, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Virkeligheten er også langt borte når Bondevik mener at det er viktig å få frem at 
«svenskesuget er psykologi og ikke basert på realiteter». Finnes det for Norge i dag en 
mer bastant politisk realitet enn Sveriges medlemskap i EU?” 
(“Bondevik”, short editorial, published in Aftenposten November 15, 1994, page 18.) 
 
”Suomen asema unionissa tai ulkopuolella riippuu tietenkin aivan ratkaisevaksi Ruotsin 
asemasta”. 
(“EU-keskustelusta sekamelskaa”, press cutting from Ilkka, published in Helsingin Sanomat 
on September 23, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Om jag vore finländare skulle jag också vilja att Sverige gick med i EU. Det skulle 
kännas tryggare med Sverige som backup och som en bro ner till Europa”. 
(“Från kol och stål till mjöl och fläsk”, guest column, published in Dagens Nyheter on 
November 6, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Ett centralt element i svensk neutralitetspolitik – att vi bör sitta still i båten för att inte 
skapa oro kring Finland – bortfaller när Finland självt söker även sin säkerhetspolitiska 
förankring västerut.” 
(“Nytt läge inför den svenska folkomröstningen”, short editorial article, published in Dagens 
Nyheter October 18, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Og den eventuelle nordiske splittelse faller i så fall sammen i tid med at de nordiske 
land har trukket opp rammen for en samarbeidsavtale om produksjon, anskaffelse og 
utnyttelse av forsvarsmateriell. Avtalen er en historisk begivenhet, som tilsier at det 
utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske skille i Norden bør forbli ensaga blott”. 
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(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 
1994, page 18.) 
 
 “At det skulle bli henne som trakk konklusjonen, er illustrerende både for den finske og 
den nordiske nyorientering i forholdet til det europeiske fellesskap.” 
(“Norge klassens sinke?”, short editorial article, published in Aftenposten on November 24, 
1994, page 18.) 
 
“Hänen [Esko Ahon] asenteensa on, että “EU-kysymys hoituu, jos on hoituakseen”, 
kuten hän sanoi lauantaina Kalevan haastattelussa. Aho ei halua lähteä avoimeen 
kampanjointiin, kuten esimerkiksi presidentti on tehnyt. (…) Ruotsin ja Norjan 
pääministerit kamppailevat täysin voimin sen puolesta, mihin he henkilökohtaisesti 
uskovat ja minkä he katsovat olevan maansa etu.” 
(“Carlsson ja Gro uskaltavat panna itsensä likoon”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat, 
September 21, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Tässä tilanteessa EU:n tilalle ehdotettu pohjoismainen yhteistyö tarkoittaisi sitä, että 
Suomi köyttäisi itsensä kiinni hukkuvaan laivaan”. 
(“Ruotsin serkusta Viron veljeksi”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
September 20, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Monet ammattiliitot sekä nais- ja kansalaisliikkeet EU-maissa asettavat paljon toiveita 
Pohjolan mukaantuloon ja sen antamaan esimerkkiin”. 
(“EU ei määrää sosiaaliturvaamme”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 2, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Pohjoismaisen mallin puolustus on tärkeää, koska Pohjoismaat ovat onnistuneet 
luomaan tähänastisen maailmanhistorian parhaan yhteiskuntarakenteen. Suomen ja 
Ruotsin on löydettävä uutta potkua talouteensa säilyttääkseen hyvinvointivaltion 
perustan. Norjalla ei valtavien öljyrahojen ansiosta ole samaa huolta. (…) Talouden ja 
hyvinvointimallin puolustuksen kohdalla avainsana on kansallinen edunvalvonta. 
Turvataksemme etumme meidän täytyy päästä siihen pöytään, jossa päätöksiä tehdään.” 
(“Suomen valinta”, column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 13, 1994, page A2.) 
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“Tarvitsemme Suomen tarkasti vaalimaa pohjoismaista perinnettä arvostellun unionin 
demokratiavajeen poistamiseksi ja päätösprosessin avoimuuden edistämiseksi”. 
(“EU-Suomesta Itämeri-alueen keskus”, guest column, published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 8, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Det är inte svenskarna som har skapat EU, och kanske hade vi velat att den politiska 
organisationen i Europa hade utformats på något annat sätt. Men vi kan inte skapa ett 
alternativt EU enligt svensk eller nordisk modell. EU finns där redan. (…) Våra 
möjligheter att utöva något politiskt inflytande på en europeisk nivå förutsätter att vi 
ansluter oss till den politiska organisation som finns och försöker påverka den inifrån”. 
(“Europa existerar även på måndag”, guest column published in Dagens Nyheter on 
November 11, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Om länderna längst upp i norr abdikerar från ett sådant delansvar betyder det i 
praktiken att vi istället ger ett motsvarande stort inflytande till andra länder. (…) Något 
brutalt kan man säga att Eftaländernas inträde i EU kan väntas minska de 
sydeuropeiska, latinska och protektionistiska ländernas inflytande över Europas framtid, 
och därmed bidra till att utveckla Europa i en riktning som mer ligger i linje med 
intressen och värderingar i norra Europa.” 
(“Vårt ansvar för Europa”, press cutting from Ekonomisk debatt published in Dagens 
Nyheter on October 16, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Ordföranden låter sympatisk när påfallande “svenskt” talar för öppenhet, jämställdhet, 
miljövänlighet samt institutioner närmare folket”. 
(“En vänlig knuff från Santer”, long editorial article published in Dagens Nyheter on 
October 31, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Blir Norge, Sverige og Finland medlem så vil Kola bli EUs nærområde. Eget 
opprydningsprogram og eget Kola-fond. Sverige og Finland er imidlertid langt mer 
interessert i at EU engasjerer seg i Østersjøen, i de baltiske land og i St. Petersburg-
området. EUs engasjement på Kola vil derfor i stor grad avhenge av Norges fremtidige 
tilknytning til unionen.” 
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(“Blir atom-trusselen EUs ansvar?”, commentary published in Aftenposten on October 18, 
1994, page 14.) 
 
“Demokratian asiaparina on Pohjolassa pidetty julkisen päätöksenteon avoimuutta. 
Euroopan unioni ei ole demokraattinen järjestö, eikä se kunnioita julkisuusperiaatetta. 
(…) Miksi sitten Pohjoismaat eivät menisi mukaan muuttamaan unionia? Mielestäni 
tilanne pitää nähdä realistisesti; vaikutusvaltamme olisi kovin vähäinen, ja toisaalta, jos 
unionilla olisi tarve muuttua meidän mallimme mukaiseksi, olisi niin tapahtunut jo 
Maastrichtin prosessin yhteydessä”. 
(“Parempi Eurooppa ihmisten ehdoilla”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
October 1, 1994, page A2.)  
 
“EU:n ulkopuolella Suomi säilyttää itselleen mahdollisuuden pitää kiinni pyrkimyksistä 
kunnioittaa yhtäläisesti kaikkia ihmisiä ja vaalia maailmanlaajaa solidaarisuutta”.  
(“EU edustaa länttä varsin heikosti”, guest column published in Helsingin Sanomat on 
September 25, 1994, page A2.) 
 
“Spørsmålet som reiser seg, er derfor om vi i Norge ser den muligheten og utfordringen 
som ligger i å stå utenfor den sterke blokkdannelsen nettopp for å kunne fortsette den 
viktige rollen som brobygger –både østover og sørover”. 
(“Norge og EU-blokken”, guest column published in Aftenposten on November 18, 1994, 
page 14.) 
 
“Välimeren maissa mentaliteetti on aivan toinen. Osaa direktiiveistä ei väitteiden 
mukaan ole ehditty tai välitetty kääntää esimerkiksi kreikaksi. Niitä ei siis tunneta, 
puhumattakaan, että niitä noudatettaisiin. (…) ei tarkoita, että virkakoneistomme pitäisi 
tinkiä korkeasta pohjoismaisesta työmoraalista ja lainkuuliaisuudesta. Liityttäessä 
sellaiseen suureen kansainväliseen yhteisöön kuin EU on kuitenkin opeteltava 
toimimaan samoilla pelisäännöillä kuin muut. Se koskee myös direktiivien asemaa ja 
noudattamista.” 
(“Suomi on direktiivien luvattu maa”, column published in Helsingin Sanomat on October 
12, 1994, page A2.) 
 
 
